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Reformers argue that ineffective teaching is the linchpin of
educational inequality and failure. Starting in 2010, they successfully
sought important changes in teacher evaluation systems at the state
and federal levels. But tenure, a fundamental source of teachers'
strength to resist more aggressive reform, remained in place. Thus, in
2012, reformers theorized a novel constitutional strategy to eliminate
tenure. They argued that tenure leads to the retention of ineffective
teachers, and that ineffective teaching deprives students of the
constitutional right to education embedded in state constitutions. This
theory immediately caught hold, with a California trial court striking
down tenure in 2014 and litigation commencing in other states weeks
thereafter.
The outcome of this litigation movement will determine both the
future of the teaching profession and the scope of the constitutional
right to education. To date, however, no high court or scholar has
thoroughly analyzed the theory. This Article offers that first analysis,
concluding that the constitutional challenge to tenure raises a
theoretically valid claim but lacks a sufficient empirical basis. At the
theoretical level, the tenure challenge easily falls within broadly
worded precedent that establishes tudents' constitutional right to an
equal and adequate education. If ineffective teaching deprives
students of equal or adequate education, state constitutions should
protect against it. But in the context of school funding cases-where
the relevant precedent first developed courts have demanded that
litigants precisely demonstrate multiple aspects of causation and
harm. Evidence on causation and harm is lacking in regard to tenure.
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This split between theory and fact requires courts to proceed
cautiously. Rejecting current tenure challenges on their face would
unfairly prejudice future legal challenges to teacher quality,
particularly those predicated on potential empirical advances in
social science. A facial rejection would also require courts to narrow
the existing scope of the constitutional right to education. This
narrowing would negatively affect education rights in other
important and developing contexts. The solution is to insist on more
detailed evidence to support plaintiffs' causal theories and presumed
remedies. By doing so, courts can validate students' constitutional
right to education without venturing into unsettled policy debates.
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INTRODUCTION
Two persistently high achievement gaps have motivated national
education policy for the past three decades: the international one between the
United States and its peers and the domestic one between racial and
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socioeconomic groups.' In recent years, scholars and policy makers have
reached a consensus that improving teacher quality is the key to resolving these
achievement gaps.2 But no consensus among researchers or policy makers has
emerged as to a strategy to actually improve teacher quality. Debates abound as
to whether years of experience, academic credentials, student outcomes, or
some other factor reflects quality teaching.3 Other more difficult questions arise
as to whether we can improve the teachers we currently have or whether we
must devise strategies to recruit stronger ones to replace them.
Nonetheless, many education reformers are convinced that eliminating
teacher tenure is the necessary first step to any meaningful reform because
tenure locks in the status quo. Their argument is simple. If teachers could not
hide behind tenure, schools could easily remove the worst teachers and the rest
would be motivated to improve. Given what we know about the effects of
quality teaching, this, they say, would dramatically improve student outcomes
4and shrink achievement gaps.
Education reformers initially sought this change through the political
process, but were, in important respects, blocked by the political strength of
teachers and their unions. Reformers are now pressing a novel constitutional
theory in the courts,6 a theory that would sidestep the political process. They
argue that tenure and the retention of ineffective teachers violates students'
constitutional right to education embedded in each of the fifty state
constitutions. For decades, state supreme courts have used state constitutional
1. See generally Valerie Strauss, Key PISA Test Results for U.S. Students, WASH. POST (Dec.
3, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2013/12/03/key-pisa-test-results-
for-u-s-students [https://perma.cc/DR25-D6XA] (reporting that U.S. math and reading scores are at or
below international average); Michael Winerip, Closing the Achievement Gap Without Widening a
Racial One, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/14/education
/14winerip.html [http://perma.cc/YBL7-MEBB] (indicating the racial achievement gap is the most
pressing issue in education).
2. See generally THE EDUC. TRUST, THEIR FAIR SHARE: How TEXAS-SIZED GAPS IN
TEACHER QUALITY SHORTCHANGE Low-INCOME AND MINORITY STUDENTS (2008); Linda Darling-
Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A Review of State Policy Evidence, 8 EDUC.
POL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1 (2000); James H. Stronge et al., What is the Relationship Between
Teacher Quality and Student Achievement? An Exploratory Study, 20 J. PERS. EVALUATION EDUC.
165, 167 (2007).
3. See discussion infra Parts I.B., II.B.
4. See discussion infra Part I.A.
5. See generally Derek W. Black, Federalizing Education by Waiver?, 68 VAND. L. REV.
607 (2015) (discussing new policies on teacher evaluation and the Common Core Curriculum).
6. Haley Sweetland Edwards, The War on Teacher Tenure, TIME, Oct. 30, 2014 (explaining
that reform-oriented individuals saw the litigation as the only way to break the national gridlock).
7. Id.; see also William E. Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional
Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1661 (1989) (detailing
the constitutional right to education in all fifty states).
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rights to equalize school funding.8 If unequal funding violates the constitutional
right to education, so too might ineffective teaching caused by tenure.
With that basic theory, a constitutional "War on Teacher Tenure" has
caught hold.9 The first case, Vergara v. State,'0 was filed in California in 2012.
The plaintiffs alleged that California statutes grant teachers tenure far too easily
and "force school administrators to keep teachers in the classroom long after
they have demonstrated themselves to be grossly ineffective."" Even when
schools must let teachers go in response to budget shortfalls during a recession,
statutes require schools to retain senior teachers over newer ones, regardless of
who might be the most effective.12 These problems are particularly acute in
predominantly poor and minority schools because they "have a
disproportionate share of grossly ineffective teachers."'3 This, plaintiffs
reasoned, violates the California Constitution's equal protection clause, under
which education is a fundamental right.14
In 2014, the trial court in Vergara became the first to strike down a tenure
statute as unconstitutional, agreeing with plaintiffs' theory.5 New York courts
are now considering the same theory under their own state constitution, with a
wave of similar cases readying for litigation in other states.16 Simply put,
tenure is on national trial. The stakes could not be higher, nor the terrain more
uncertain. Current research offers little hard evidence as to whether eliminating
tenure will finally free schools to take the necessary steps to improve teaching
or just make matters worse by creating additional workplace pressures that
render the profession even less attractive to existing and potential teachers. In
8. See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational Opportunity, and the
Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1500-05 (2006) (discussing plaintiff victories in
school funding litigation).
9. Edwards, supra note 6.
10. Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014).
11. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, Vergara v. State, No.
BC484642 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Vergara Complaint], 2012 WL 10129922.
12. This challenge is to the "Last-I-First-Out" statute, which mandates that schools retain
senior teachers when making reductions in force and thereby prevents administrators from relying on
teaching effectiveness to let teachers go. Id. at 2, 6-7. Although this Article primarily evaluates the
challenge to tenure rather than seniority or last-in-first-out statutes, it will address seniority statutes to
explain how they arguably raise a more compelling legal theory. In particular, seniority statutes
necessarily have systematic effects during reductions-in-force and thereby have the potential to
systematically affect teacher quality. This Article, however, does not elevate seniority statutes to a
primary level of analysis because reductions-in-force should occur only in isolated circumstances and,
thus, under normal circumstances, may bear little relevance to long-term teaching quality.
13. d. at 1.
14. d. at 4-5.
15. Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415.
16. Al Baker, Lawsuit Challenges New York's Teacher Tenure Laws, N.Y. TImES, July 4,
2014, at A14; see also PlaintiffAttorney in the Landmark Vergara Case in Twin Cities to Talk About
Teacher Tenure, CLASS ACT BLOG, MINN. STAR TRIB. (Nov. 14, 2014, 5:21 PM),
http://www.startribune.com/plaintiff-attorney-in-the-landmark-vergara-case-in-twin-cities-to-talk-
about-teacher-tenure/282763021 [http://perma.cc/ZX23-3G9Y] (discussing possible Vergara-like suits
in Minnesota).
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addition, filtering these questions through the constitutional right to education
will require courts to define the scope of that right,7 which could affect any
number of education policies beyond teaching.
To date, no high court or scholar has thoroughly vetted the constitutional
argument against tenure. The claim is so unique that few guideposts-other
than the broadly stated right to an equal or adequate education-exist.'8 This
Article provides that first analysis.19 It concludes that although the tenure
theory is valid on its face, the theory lacks sufficient evidentiary support. This
conclusion leaves open the possibility of future meritorious challenges to
tenure while preventing speculative and uncertain evidence from dictating
education policy.20 It also distinguishes policy preferences from
constitutionally enforceable mandates.
The specific issue of whether the tenure theory is valid is relatively
straightforward. No one questions that ineffective teaching negatively affects
student outcomes. If tenure is the cause of ineffective teaching, students'
constitutional right to education should require the state to respond to the
problem. When a state does not, it deprives students of the constitutional right
to education. Existing school funding precedent would strongly support this
theory. Thus, courts should not dismiss the challenge to tenure on its face.
Beyond theory, however, the constitutional challenge to tenure falls well
short of the evidentiary requirements prior courts have set for other violations
of the constitutional right to education. The weakness of the evidentiary claim
is apparent on four grounds. First, plaintiffs lack evidence that tenure is
causally connected to ineffective teaching. Ineffective teaching might persist
with or without tenure. For instance, labor market forces, segregation, school
21funding, and school leadership significantly contribute to ineffective teaching.
No evidence suggests that tenure supersedes these factors. Moreover, even if
eliminating tenure allowed administrators to more easily remove ineffective
teachers, eliminating tenure could also produce indirect effects that might
17. See Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the
Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 390-403 (2012) (discussing the potential
breadth of constitutional rights to education); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE
L.J. 249, 307-10 (1999).
18. Michael Rebell, a longtime scholar and litigator of constitutional education claims, calls
the theory "unprecedented." Baker, supra note 16.
19. Like the earliest school equity and adequacy decisions, the first full and thoughtful analysis
will play an outsized role across jurisdictions. See generally Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind:
New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 129 (1995) (identifying New
Jersey's and West Virginia's school finance decisions as beacons).
20. Some early school finance opinions, skeptical of the causal connection between money
and educational outcomes, peremptorily hobbled litigation in their states. See, e.g., Comm. for Educ.
Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 160-61 (Ga.
1981). This Article's rationale avoids that problem.
21. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 333-34 (N.Y. 2003)
(examining how low-quality teaching was caused by market forces); Wendy Parker, Desegregating
Teachers, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008).
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undermine the teaching profession overall.22 If so, the net result of eliminating
tenure could be negative, and tenure would not play the causal role that
plaintiffs assume.
Second, even if tenure causes ineffective teaching, plaintiffs have not
demonstrated that the number of ineffective teachers that tenure protects rises
to the level of a substantial and systematic educational deprivation.23 For
instance, one out of a student's ten teachers may be ineffective, but that teacher
does not necessarily undermine the student's overall educational opportunity to
the extent necessary for a court to deem the student's education inadequate.
Even if inadequate, plaintiffs may need to show systematic repetition of the
problem.24 Otherwise, random local variation, rather than state policy, would
cause the inadequacy. Seniority statutes, which Vergara and the New York
litigation also challenged, could potentially have systematic effects on teacher
quality during a large reduction-in-force, but to the extent these reductions are
abnormal, their bearing on the long-term teacher quality in a district may be
25
negligible.
Third, ignoring these and other serious causal questions, plaintiffs rely on
generalized social science about the effects of quality teachers on student
26outcomes. This generalized research does not address the effects of tenure on
student outcomes. Even if it did, generalized evidence of this sort is insufficient
to establish the state's specific causation that courts have required in school
27funding cases.
Fourth, plaintiffs seek a remedy that would potentially violate separation
of powers constraints. Plaintiffs identify tenure as a singular flaw in state law
and its elimination as a singular solution. No prior litigation to enforce the right
to education has ever narrowed its focus so far, and for good reason. The
details of educational policy, including solutions to constitutional violations,
22. Sam Dillon, Teachers' Union Shuns Obama Aides at Convention, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
2010, at A8 (quoting head of nation's largest teacher union stating that today's teachers "face the most
anti-educator, anti-union, anti-student environment" ever).
23. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976) (requiring substantial disparities);
Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 605 (Ct. App. 1986), cause dismissed (Oct. 27, 1989), review
granted, and opinion superseded sub nom. Placentia Unified Sch. Dist. v. Riles, 723 P.2d 1248 (Cal.
1986) (explaining that simply touching on a fundamental right is insufficient to trigger heightened
scrutiny); Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1285 (Conn. 1996) (requiring substantial disparities).
24. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Pauley v.
Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1984) (evaluating the overall education system for a violation).
25. A court addressing the immediate effects of teacher layoffs, however, might have a
stronger basis upon which to intervene in contrast to the general challenge to tenure.
26. They rely heavily on the general research and testimony of Dr. Raj Chetty. See Raj Chetty
et al., The Long-Term Impacts of Teachers: Teacher Value-Added and Student Outcomes in Adulthood
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17,699, 2011).
27. See, e.g., Serrano, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 615 (rejecting state responsibility because disparities
were not caused by state policy); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 340, 343
(N.Y. 2003) (requiring input and output causation, and addressing supervening causes).
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rest within the discretion of legislatures.28 Where more than one solution to a
constitutional violation is possible or reasonable, constitutions vest legislatures
with the discretion to choose among them.29 The potential solutions to
ineffective teaching and teacher removal are multifaceted, placing them within
the domain of the legislature and making them ill-suited to judicial prerogative.
Moreover, plaintiffs assume that some other better alternative to a tenure
system exists, but current research and litigation indicate serious practical and
constitutional due process flaws in the alternatives.30 None of the foregoing is
meant to minimize the problem of ineffective teaching. Ineffective teaching
demands a solution, but presuming that eliminating tenure through
constitutional litigation is a solution, much less the best among many
competing possibilities, is dangerous.3 '
This Article evaluates the constitutional challenge to tenure in four Parts.
Part I explains the social science evidence regarding the importance of quality
teachers to students' educational outcomes. It also explores traditional theories
of why our schools suffer from low quality teaching and how to resolve the
problem. In this respect, it offers a primer on the potential causes of ineffective
teaching, which are central to the legal questions raised by the constitutional
challenge to tenure.
Part II details the most recent legislative efforts to use statistical models
that pair students' standardized test scores to individual teachers as a major
factor in the tenure and termination of teachers. Part II also examines the
scientific and legal validity of these models, pointing out the technical
limitations in the data systems and the attendant due process concerns that the
limitations raise. This background analysis is key to fully evaluating the
constitutional challenge to tenure because these models would serve as the
basis for identifying teachers for termination or tenure denial. Plaintiffs' lead
expert in Vergara specifically premises his conclusions about the benefits of
eliminating grossly ineffective teachers on one of these models.32 If these
evaluation systems are fundamentally flawed, however, plaintiffs may be
28. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006); see also
Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996).
29. See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 213-14; Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365,
392-95 (N.C. 2004).
30. See Bruce D. Baker et al., The Legal Consequences of Mandating High Stakes Decisions
Based on Low Quality Information: Teacher Evaluation in the Race-to-the-Top Era, 21 EDUC. POL'Y
ANALYSIS ARCHIVES (2013).
3 1. See generally Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalism for the Right to
Education, 48 GA. L. REV. 949, 961-65, 977 (2014) (explaining the nature of polycentric problems
and identifying remedies in constitutional education litigation as raising polycentric challenges); Kevin
G. Welner, Silver Linings Casebook: How Vergara's Backers May Lose by Winning, 15 U. MD. L.J.
RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 121, 122 (2015) (emphasizing how the theory of Vergara might
"invit[e] litigation with very different goals for school policy and reform" beyond just the tenure
claim).
32. See Chetty et al., supra note 26 (relying on value-added statistical modeling).
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asking courts to trade one constitutional violation-unequal educational
opportunities stemming from ineffective teaching-for another unreliable
evaluation systems that deny teachers due process.
Part III evaluates the theory that tenure might violate students'
constitutional right to education. Part III first constructs the theoretical and
practical frameworks to explain how courts evaluate constitutional challenges
to educational deprivations. Next, Part III situates tenure challenges within this
framework, identifying the advantages and disadvantages of the claim. It
includes an analysis of the related challenges to seniority systems that mandate
the retention of senior teachers over junior teachers during reductions-in-force,
regardless of teaching effectiveness.
Based on this analysis, Part IV articulates the legal, factual, and policy-
based conclusions that courts should reach in adjudicating these cases,
reasoning that plaintiffs have stated a claim, but need far more evidence than is
currently available to substantiate their claim in regard to tenure. In short, Part
IV concludes that courts should reject the current constitutional challenges to
tenure on the facts.
I.
THE IMPORTANCE OF AND INSUFFICIENT ACCESS TO QUALITY TEACHERS
A. Quality Teachers and Improved Student Outcomes
The centrality of quality teachers to educational outcomes is intuitive.
Voluminous social science findings confirm that teacher quality is among the
most significant variables in student outcomes.33 But equally well established is
that an individual student's socioeconomic status, along with that of his peers,
exerts enormous influence on educational outcomes. Students attending
predominantly low-income schools achieve at lower levels, regardless of their
own individual socioeconomic status.34 These socioeconomic variables also
33. See, e.g., JAMES H. STRONGE & PAMELA D. TUCKER, NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, TEACHER
EVALUATION AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT (2000); LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, NAT'L COMM'N
ON TEACHING & AM.'s FUTURE, DOING WHAT MATTERS MOST: INVESTING IN QUALITY TEACHING
(1997); BRIAN ROWAN ET AL., CONSORTIUM FOR POL'Y RESEARCH IN EDUC., RESEARCH REPORT
No. RR-05 1, WHAT LARGE-SCALE, SURVEY RESEARCH TELLS US ABOUT TEACHER EFFECTS ON
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: INSIGHTS FROM THE PROSPECTS STUDY OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS
(2002); Joseph 0. Oluwole, Tenure and the "Highly Qualified Teacher" Requirement, 8 WHITTIER J.
CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC. 157, 158 (2009) (discussing the "various studies [that] have shown that
teachers are important to student achievement"); Steven G. Rivkin et al., Teachers, Schools, and
Academic Achievement, 73 ECONOMETRICA 417 (2005); S. Paul Wright et al., Teachers and
Classroom Context Effects on Student Achievement: Implications for Teacher Evaluation, 11 J.
PERSONNEL EVALUATION EDUC. 57 (1997).
34. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, EQUALITY OF
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 302-10 (1966); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now:
CREATING MIDDLE CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 47-76 (2001); Geoffrey D.
Borman & Maritza Dowling, Schools and Inequality: A Multilevel Analysis of Coleman's Equality of
Educational Opportunity Data, 112 TCHRS. C. REC. 1201 (2010); Molly S. McUsic, The Future of
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intersect with teaching quality. Predominantly poor and minority schools find it
hard to recruit, hire, and retain high quality teachers because those teachers
would rather teach elsewhere.35 Even if this were not the case, quality teachers
cannot singlehandedly eliminate the disadvantages that low-income students in
predominantly poor schools face. In short, while teacher quality is extremely
important to student outcomes, poverty and race would appear to play a
precedent role in student outcomes.
Some social scientists, however, have begun to challenge the notion of
student determinism with more concrete findings regarding the longitudinal
36effects of teacher quality on student outcomes and achievement gaps. One
prominent study found that "having a top-quartile teacher rather than a bottom-
quartile teacher four years in a row would be enough to close the black-white
test score gap."37 Another found that elementary students assigned to high-
performing teachers for three straight years achieve fifty percentile points
higher on standardized tests than students assigned to low-performing
teachers.3 8 Scholars have also dramatized these findings by quantifying the
Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334,
1355-56 (2004); Laura B. Perry & Andrew McConney, Does the SES of the School Matter? An
Examination of Socioeconomic Status and Student Achievement Using PISA 2003, 112 TCHRS. C.
REC. 1137 (2010); Russell W. Rumberger & Gregory J. Palardy, Does Resegregation Matter? The
Impact of Social Composition on Academic Achievement in Southern High Schools, in SCHOOL
RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 127 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds.,
2005); see also Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Segregation and the SAT 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 157 (2006);
Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Subverting Swann: First- and Second-Generation Segregation in the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 38 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 215 (2001) (finding that even after controlling
for factors such as a student's family background, prior achievement, peer effects, and self-reported
academic effort, the more time students spent in predominantly minority elementary schools in
Charlotte Mecklenburg's school district, the worse their academic achievement would be in middle
and high school in terms of standardized tests and grade point averages).
35. Charles Clotfelter et al., High-Poverty Schools and the Distribution of Teachers and
Principals, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1372-73 (2007); Charles T. Clotfelter et al., no Teaches hom?
Race and the Distribution of Novice Teachers, 24 ECON. EDUC. REV. 377 (2005); Parker, supra note
21, at 35-36.
36. See, e.g., PATRICIA CAHAPE HAMMER ET AL., EDVANTIA, RURAL TEACHER
RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION PRACTICES: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH LITERATURE, NATIONAL
SURVEY OF RURAL SUPERINTENDENTS, AND CASE STUDIES OF PROGRAMS IN VIRGINIA 1, 10 (2005)
("A growing body of research indicates that the most important thing schools can do to improve
student achievement is to ensure there is a high-quality teacher in every classroom."); Ethan Hutt &
Aaron Tang, The New Education Malpractice Litigation, 99 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2013); THE EDUC.
TRUST, supra note 2, at 2 ("[R]esearchers warn that assigning low-performing students to a series of
ineffective teachers is 'educationally deadly."').
37. ROBERT GORDON ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INST., IDENTIFYING EFFECTIVE TEACHERS
USING PERFORMANCE ON THE JOB 8 (2006), www.brookings.edu/views/papers/200604
hamilton_ .pdf [http://perma.cc/L6V9-TZP3]. See generally Elizabeth Powell, The Quest for Teacher
Quality: Early Lessons from Race to the Top and State Legislative Efforts Regarding Teacher
Evaluation, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1061, 1070 (2013) ("This significant finding has heavily shaped
education policy over the last several years.").
38. WILLIAM L. SANDERS & JUNE C. RIVERS, UNIV. OF TENN. VALUE-ADDED RESEARCH &
ASSESSMENT CTR., CUMULATIVE AND RESIDENTIAL EFFECTS OF TEACHERS ON FUTURE STUDENT
ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT 3, 6-7 (1996). By "high-performing," the authors mean teachers who ave
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effect of teacher quality on the nation as a whole.39 Eric Hanushek concludes
that minimal improvements to the lowest performing group of teachers would
move the United States toward the top of international rankings of educational
attainment and add trillions of dollars to our gross domestic product each
40year.
B. The Challenge ofldentifying and Supplying Quality Teachers
The difficult question is not whether quality teaching matters, but how to
identify, measure, and actually improve teaching quality. For decades, states
have relied on competency testing as one check on teacher quality.41 Those
tests were, in some instances, insufficiently rigorous and, in other instances,
42under-enforced. More experienced teachers, for instance, might be
exempted.43 The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB or the Act) attempted to
address the problem with a national mandate: all teachers of core subjects must
be highly qualified.44 Unfortunately, this attempt failed.
The Act left states to define and measure teacher quality themselves,
creating a race to the bottom in some.45 That problem aside, certification
requirements did nothing to actually increase the number of available qualified
teachers. Rather, the mandate's real achievement was to reveal the high number
of uncertified and low-credentialed teachers in our nation's schools, and that
high "value-added" scores based on a statistical analysis of their students' standardized test results. Id.
at 6. For further explanation of value-added scores, see Part II.A.
39. See ROBIN CHAIT, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, REMOVING CHRONICALLY INEFFECTIVE
TEACHERS: BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2010) ("[D]ismissing the bottom quartile of novice
teachers in the district after their first year based on value-added stimates would result in a net
increase in student test score gains of 1.2 percentage points annually across the district."); Eric A.
Hanushek, Valuing Teachers, EDUC. NEXT, Summer 2011, at 41, 43.
40. Hanushek, supra note 39, at 41, 43.
41. See generally Jerry R. Parkinson, The Use of Competency Testing in the Evaluation of
Public School Teachers, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 845, 845 (1991) (noting that "[a] majority of states now
employ competency tests as a prerequisite to the initial certification of prospective teachers"). The
high-quality teacher requirement in the No Child Left Behind Act was similarly premised on
qualifications, deeming a teacher highly qualified if he or she passed the state's exam or experience-
based certification process. 20 U.S.C. § 6319 (2012).
42. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 39, Martinez v. State, No. D-
101-CV-2014-00793 (N.M. Dist. Ct. April 1, 2014) [hereinafter Martinez Complaint] ("[The] prior
[teacher rating] system was not applied in a manner to ensure a sufficient education and most chools
rated most eachers as 'meeting competency."'); Parkinson, supra note 41, at 845-46.
43. See Jane G. Noble, Note, Teacher Termination and Competency Testing, 63 TEX. L. REV.
933, 938 & n.25 (1985) (noting that only few larger districts, despite having the necessary resources,
test currently certified teachers); Parkinson, supra note 41, at 845-46 (discussing states' reluctance to
require previously certified teachers to pass a competency examination).
44. 20 U.S.C. § 6319(a)(2).
45. Id. § 7801(23) (defining "highly qualified"); see also James F. Ryan, The Perverse
Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 976-78 (2004) (describing the
perverse incentives for states to lower their academic standards and teacher quality requirements so as
to make them easier to meet).
85
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
they are concentrated in particular schools.46 In fact, systemic violations of the
teacher quality requirements mounted quicker than violations of any other
47NCLB requirement, including improving student est scores.
Even if states had complied with the Act, the Act's basic premise
regarding how to measure teacher quality may have been fundamentally
flawed. The Act assumed that teaching credentials are a reliable proxy for
teacher quality. Some minimal qualifications are necessary to be an effective
teacher,48 but possessing a master's degree, for instance, does not necessarily
make one teacher more effective than another who only has a bachelor's
degree. To the contrary, many studies conclude that both teacher credentials
and experience are unreliable proxies for teaching effectiveness or quality.4 9
Given the Act's flawed premise and implementation, federal officials
abandoned enforcement of the teacher mandate very early into the Act's life.50
46. See, e.g., EDUC. COMM'N OF THE STATES, ECS REPORT TO THE NATION: STATE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 69 (2004) (showing that not a single state
was on track to meet teacher requirements); see also Renee v. Duncan, 623 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 2010)
(finding California had failed to meet teacher requirements in high minority schools).
47. EDuC. COMM'N, supra note 46, app. B at 81-86 (indicating not a single state was on track
to meet NCLB's highly qualified teacher and high-quality professional development requirements
whereas more than half of states were on track to meet every other requirement).
48. See Darling-Hammond, supra note 2 (finding negative impact of having teacher without
even a minor in the subject taught); Dan D. Goldhaber & Dominic J. Brewer, Does Teacher
Certification Matter? High School Teacher Certfication Status and Student Achievement, 22 EDUC.
EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 129 (2000) (finding positive impact of teachers with a major in the
subject taught); see also Rivkin et al., supra note 33 (finding positive effect of teachers with more than
three years of experience).
49. Marco A. Mufioz & Florence C. Chang, The Elusive Relationship Between Teacher
Characteristics and Student Academic Growth: A Longitudinal Multilevel Model for Change, 20 J.
PERS. EVALUATION EDUC. 147, 148 (2007) (finding mixed results as to whether teacher qualifications
are related to student achievement); Powell, supra note 37, at 1068 (claiming that after NCLB "it
became apparent hat . . . 'Highly qualified' teachers were not necessarily highly effective"). In
reviewing the literature on this point, the Ninth Circuit wrote, "It is unclear whether fully certified
teachers provide a better education than teachers participating in alternative route programs." Renee v.
Duncan, 573 F.3d 903, 912 n.9 (9th Cir. 2009) (comparing KATI HAYCOCK, THE EDUC. TRUST,
GOOD TEACHING MATTERS: How WELL-QUALiIED TEACHERS CAN CLOSE THE GAP 13 (1998)
("Education courses completed, advanced education degrees, scores on professional knowledge
sections of licensing exams, even, interestingly, years of experience none seem to have a clear
relationship to student achievement."), and Thomas J. Kane et al., Photo Finish: Certification Doesn't
Guarantee a Winner, EDUC. NEXT, Winter 2007, at 64 ("[A] teacher's certification status matters little
for student learning."), with Linda Darling-Hammond, Access to Quality Teaching: An Analysis of
Inequality in Calfornia's Public Schools, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1045, 1051 (2003) ("National
studies have ... found that differences in teachers' qualifications including teachers' general ability,
knowledge of subject matter, preparation for teaching, and certification status, which reflects aspects
of all of these other indicators-show significant effects on student achievement measured at the state,
district, school, and individual student levels.")), opinion withdrawn and superseded on denial of
reh'g, 623 F.3d787 (9th Cir. 2010), opinion supplemented on reh'g, 686 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2012).
50. Letter from Margaret Spellings, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Chief State School Officers
(July 23, 2007), http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/secletter/070723.html [http://perma.cc/FLT9-
MR9Z] (indicating that Secretary Spellings would continue to excuse states for failing to meet teacher
requirements).
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C. Potential Causes of Ineffective Teaching
1. School Segregation
The cause of ineffective teaching and the means by which to remedy it
present another set of difficult questions. A number of scholars focus on
supply-side causes. For instance, predominantly poor and minority schools find
it particularly difficult to recruit and retain teachers in general, much less
highly effective ones.5 ' These challenges cannot be easily remedied because
the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of schools significantly influence
52where teachers decide to teach. In other words, the root of inequitable access
to quality teachers is school segregation,53 not teacher policy itself. School
51. See, e.g., STEPHEN CARROLL ET AL., RAND EDuc., THE DISTRIBUTION OF TEACHERS
AMONG CALIFORNIA'S SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND SCHOOLS (2000); SUSANNA LOEB & MICHELLE
REININGER, THE EDUC. POLICY CTR. AT MICH. STATE UNIV., PUBLIC POLICY AND TEACHER LABOR
MARKETS: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHY IT MATTERS (2004); DANIEL P. MAYER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T
OF EDUC., MONITORING SCHOOL QUALITY: AN INDICATORS REPORT (2000),
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/2001030.pdf [http://perma.cc/2CZK-9866]; Charles T. Clotfelter et al.,
Who Teaches Whom?, supra note 35; Darling-Hammond, supra note 2; Catherine F. Freeman et al.,
Racial Segregation in Georgia Public Schools, 1994-2001, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION, supra note
34, at 148, 157-59; Eric A. Hanushek et al., Why Public Schools Lose Teachers, 39 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 326, 337 (2004); Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test Score
Gap: Why It Persists and What Can Be Done, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 13, 2008),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1998/03/spring-education-jencks [http://perma.cc/4X9P-
LSJ4] ("Predominantly white schools seem to attract more skilled teachers than black schools.");
Rivkin et al., supra note 33; see also BARNETT BERRY & ERIC HIRSCH, CTR. FOR TEACHING
QUALITY, RECRUITING AND RETAINING TEACHERS FOR HARD-TO-STAFF SCHOOLS (2005)
(identifying recruitment and retention problems in high poverty, low performing schools); ERICA
FRANKENBERG, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., THE SEGREGATION OF AMERICAN
TEACHERS 25-26 (2006) (revealing that teacher dissatisfaction tends to rise as the percentage of
minority students in a school rises, making it more likely that teachers will leave); SUSAN MOORE
JOHNSON ET AL., HARVARD GRADUATE SCH. OF EDUC., WHO STAYS IN TEACHING AND WHY: A
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON TEACHER RETENTION (2005); THE EDUC. TRUST, supra note 2, at 6
(illustrating how most of Texas's districts, the poorest and mostly minority, also have the highest rate
of teacher turnover).
52. Jane L. David, Teacher Recruitment Incentives, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Apr. 2008, at 84;
Susanna Loeb et al., How Teaching Conditions Predict Teacher Turnover in California Schools, 80
PEABODY J. EDUC., no. 3, 2005, at 44 (noting that moderate salary increases, for instance, may be
insufficient to break this cycle); Parker, supra note 21; Benjamin Scafidi et al., Race, Poverty, and
Teacher Mobility, 26 ECON. EDUC. REV. 145 (2007). For instance, past incentive pay policies have
been generally insufficient to alter unequal distribution patterns. See, e.g., Hanushek et al., supra note
51, at 350-51 (finding that a ten percent salary increase would be necessary for each increase of ten
percent in minority student enrollment o induce white women to teach in the school); ALL. FOR
EXCELLENT EDUC, IMPROVING THE DISTRIBUTION OF TEACHERS IN Low-PERFORMING HIGH
SCHOOLS 7 (2008), http://all4ed.org/reports-factsheets/improving-the-distribution-of-teachers-in-low-
performing-high-schools [http://perma.cc/K9RQ-HAW8] (indicating that several states already have
incentive pay for low-performing schools, but pay increase alone is insufficient to attract teachers). But
see Charles Clotfelter et al., Would Higher Salaries Keep Teachers in High-Poverty Schools?
Evidence from a Policy Intervention in North Carolina, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1352 (2008).
53. See Benjamin Michael Superfine, The Promises and Pitfalls of Teacher Evaluation and
Accountability Reform, 17 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 591, 592 (2014) ("This movement to increase
teacher effectiveness has trong roots extending to efforts focused on equalizing students' educational
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finance litigation has also demonstrated that poor rural communities face
analogous challenges in hiring teachers due to geography and money,54 both of
which are beyond their control. In short, structural problems of race, poverty,
geography, and money exert enormous influences on students' access to quality
instruction.
2. Underdeveloped Market for Teachers
Another group of scholars locate the cause of unequal access to quality
teachers at a higher macro level, arguing that the fundamental problem is a
labor market and higher education pipeline that does not drive sufficiently
qualified individuals into the profession or keep them there. Compared to
other countries, the United States' teacher education, preparation, and
56compensation systems under-incentivize the teaching profession. Thus, our
teaching quality problems can only be resolved by taking steps to expand the
teaching pool and recruit more ambitious individuals into it, not by
micromanaging and certifying the ones in our current pool.
3. Ineffective Personnel Management
Finally, in the last decade, another group of scholars and policy makers
have turned toward a business and econometrics approach to teaching quality.
They locate the causes of ineffective teaching in the way schools manage and
motivate teachers. The education system makes almost no effort to distinguish
between teachers, treating them instead as interchangeable "widgets."5 This,
they say, creates a disincentive to teaching excellence and, over time, leads to
"instructional lethargy where the lowest performer sets the standard for the
opportunities that began with the struggle to desegregate schools and continued with school finance
reform litigation.").
54. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 252 (N.C. 1997); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v.
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993).
55. See, e.g., Frank Adamson & Linda Darling-Hammond, Funding Disparities and the
Inequitable Distribution of Teachers: Evaluating Sources and Solutions, EDUC. POL'Y ANALYSIS
ARCHIVES, Nov. 19, 2012, at 1, 9 ("Those most responsive to salary differences in their decisions to
remain in teaching include beginning teachers, those in high-demand fields such as mathematics and
science, and those who have higher measured ability." (citations omitted)); Marigee P. Bacolod, Do
Alternative Opportunities Matter? The Role of Female Labor Markets in the Decline of Teacher
Quality, 89 REv. ECON. & STAT. 737 (2007).
56. Other countries do a far better job of raising the prestige of schools of education and the
profession in general. Our schools of education admit most students who apply. This then breeds a
desire to counteract permissive admissions policies through odious certification processes. See
generally Michael A. Rebell, Safeguarding the Right to a Sound Basic Education in Times of Fiscal
Constraint, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1855, 1949 (2012) (discussing the prestige of the teaching profession in
Finland, South Korea, and Singapore).
57. See DANIEL WEISBERG ET AL., THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, THE WIDGET EFFECT: OUR
NATIONAL FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND ACT ON DIFFERENCES IN TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS 10
(2009).
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entire staff."" Those who might want to promote more effective teaching
would be blocked at every turn. Seniority systems, tenure, and due process bar
or stiffly resist otherwise effective personnel actions.59 The procedural process
of removing even the most grossly ineffective teachers from the classroom is
extremely difficult and costly.60
Once a teacher receives tenure, the teacher can only be removed based on
statutory grounds.61 The grounds fall into two major categories: misconduct
62and performance. To remove an ineffective teacher, states typically require a
63
demonstrated record of incompetent teaching over a period of time. The
extended time period affords the teacher notice of the deficiency and an
opportunity to remediate the deficiency.64 Once those requirements have been
met, a tenured teacher still must receive formal notice of the school's intent to
terminate and an opportunity to contest the determination of incompetence
65through administrative hearings and appeals.
For decades, state statutes refrained from precisely defining incompetence
66or ineffectiveness, which further complicated the removal process. As one
state supreme court explained, "the term 'incompetent' is generic in its
meaning and of itself conveys no information of the particular act of
58. Ralph D. Mawdsley et al., "A 'Law' Too Far"? The Wisconsin Budget Repair Act:
Counterpoint, 275 EDUC. L. REP. 16, 19 (2012).
59. See, e.g., Nicholas Dagostino, Giving the School Bully a Timeout: Protecting Urban
Students from Teachers' Unions, 63 ALA. L. REV. 177, 196 (2011) (critiquing the role of seniority
rather than teaching effectiveness in layoffs); PATRICK McGuINN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, RINGING
THE BELL FOR K-12 TEACHER TENURE REFORM 2 (2010) (stating that "political opposition and
technical challenges around tenure reform have historically prevented [teacher effectiveness policies]
from advancing very far in state legislatures"); Stephen Sawchuk, Due Process Laws Vary for
Teachers by State, EDUC. WEEK, Sept. 24, 2014, at 1 (discussing the debate over whether due process
protections unnecessarily impede the removal of ineffective teachers or ensure fairness).
60. See generally CHAIT, supra note 39, at 10-12, 14-15 (discussing the time and cost of
teacher dismissal); Hutt & Tang, supra note 36, at 423 (discussing removal cost of $250,000 per
teacher in New York); Katharine B. Stevens, Tenured Teacher Dismissal in New York: Education Law
§ 3020-a "Disciplinary Procedures and Penalties" (Am. Enterprise Inst., Working Paper No. 2014-1,
2014) (arguing that procedures are dominated by teacher rehabilitation rather than dismissal).
61. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44932 (West 2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:442 (2014);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 122A.41(2)(a) (West 2015).
62. See Oluwole, supra note 33, at 175-83; Stephen Sawchuk, D.C. Teachers Improved After
Overhaul of Evaluations, Pay, EDUC. WEEK, Oct. 23, 2013, at 8 (analyzing several state discharge
statutes such as New York, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania).
63. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3020-b (McKinney 2015) (requiring "two or more
consecutive annual ineffective ratings"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-25-440 (2015) (requiring principal to
assist teacher with improving teacher in advance of taking any formal steps to dismiss the teacher).
Those who rely on horror stories of the length and difficulty of removing alcoholic or sexually abusive
teachers offer misplaced critiques of tenure. See, e.g., J. Tyler Walthall, Us Got the Bestest Teachers in
the Everywhere: North Carolina Public School Teacher Employment Problems, Interests, and
Potential Solutions, 36 CAMPBELL L. REv. 303, 311-13 (2014) (premising a critique on ineffective
tenured teachers based on cases that do not involve ineffective teaching).
64. See Sawchuk, supra note 62.
6 5. Id.
66. See generally Oluwole, supra note 33, at 175-78.
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commission or omission, or want of qualification which will authorize" a
67teacher's removal. Therein lies the problem for school districts. If they do not
have a reliable standard for what constitutes incompetence or ineffective
teaching, they cannot identify a teacher as such and, thus, cannot pursue
68dismissal on those grounds. Cognizant of this reality, most administrators
make no attempt to critically evaluate teachers. Instead, they give all teachers
good to very good evaluations,69 knowing that less than good evaluations
would create dissension and conflict to no end.70 The practical result is a
profession left with no incentives, no quantitative or qualitative checks, and no
ability to improve teaching performance.
Some argue that anti-tenure advocates seriously misrepresent and
overstate the barriers to removal. When poor performance is properly
documented, courts generally defer to administrators' assessments of
teachers.7 ' Teachers escape termination not because of the law, but because
principals believe "firing an ineffective teacher may yield little benefit because
of the difficulties associated ... with finding qualified replacement teachers."72
Until the market changes, the solution is to focus on developing and
remediating the teachers we have.73
Reformers interpret this as just a call for more of the same. They argue
that the only way to break the cycle of ineffective teaching is to suffer the
short-term losses to affect long-term changes in the market. A move to
differentiated retention and pay, they say, would motivate existing teachers,
improve retention of good teachers, and change the perception of the
profession, thereby encouraging higher performing individuals to enter it.74
67. Cty. Bd. of Educ.. v. Oliver, 116 So. 2d 566, 567 (Ala. 1959). Other state courts have
reasoned that the term creates a floor of sufficiency in teaching, below which a teacher cannot fall, but
those courts still do not identify that floor. See, e.g., Benke v. Neenan, 658 P.2d 860, 861 (Colo. 1983);
Sekor v. Bd. of Educ., 689 A.2d 1112, 1119 (Conn. 1997).
68. WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 57, at 2.
69. Id. at 11 (revealing that only 0.3 percent and 0.4 percent of teachers in Toledo and
Chicago, respectively, received unsatisfactory ratings); Perry A. Zirkel, Legal Boundaries for
Performance Evaluation of Public School Professional Personnel, 172 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3 (2003)
(discussing that "over 99 percent of the administrators gave teachers perfect ratings" in Pennsylvania).
70. Hutt & Tang, supra note 36, at 423-24 ("Some researchers also suggest that even if
dismissing a teacher were not so difficult, administrators might still avoid it for reasons related to
school culture, such as a desire to avoid unpleasant encounters or a fear of harming school morale.").
71. See Stella C. Batagiannis, Commentary, The School District Is Not Married to Mediocrity,
26 EDUc. L. REP. 939, 939 (1985) (discussing cases deferring to administrators' tenure decisions).
72. Hutt & Tang, supra note 36, at 424; see also Batagiannis, supra note 71.
73. See Linda Darling-Hammond & Barnett Berry, Highly Qualified Teachers for All, EDUC.
LEADERSHIP, Nov. 2006, at 14.
74. See WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 57.
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II.
PROMOTING TEACHING EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH DATA-DRIVEN
EVALUATIONS
The econometrics and business approach to teacher evaluation and
management has recently gained a foothold in state law due, in large part, to
the coalescing of various interests. During the recent recession, teachers
75became the prime target for politicians seeking to offset falling revenues.
Anti-labor groups had long argued that teachers' unions manipulate the
political process to secure unreasonable benefits and protections for
themselves.76 Those anti-labor interests intersected with those seeking to
substantively reform education. Education reformers, at both the state and
federal level, were already pushing for more teacher accountability.78 A set of
federal competitive grant programs and new conditions on receiving waivers
under NCLB pushed teacher policies over the edge, prompting an entirely new
set of state statutory frameworks.
The following Sections briefly describe these new statutory frameworks
and data systems, and then analyze the important practical and legal questions
that they raise. First, do states' performance data systems accurately measure
teaching effectiveness? Second, does the implementation of these systems
violate teachers' statutory or constitutional rights? The answers to these
questions, while not directly raised in the constitutional challenge to teacher
tenure, are of huge significance. The challenge to tenure presupposes that
schools can (1) reliably identify ineffective or grossly ineffective teachers and
(2) remove them with no serious legal obstacle other than tenure.79 But if
neither is true, the constitutional challenge to tenure may not produce the
operational results that advocates seek.
75. See, e.g., Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 337 (Wis. 2014) (litigating over
legislative changes to collective bargaining rights in the state); Mawdsley et al., supra note 58, at 19.
76. See generally Dagostino, supra note 59, at 181-85.
77. Some would charge even more sinister motivations. They see teacher evaluation, federal
accountability, charter schools, and the narrative of failing schools as an attack on public education
itself See generally DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL
SYSTEM: How TESTING AND CHOICE ARE UNDERMINING EDUCATION (2010). These efforts to
improve public education are really an effort to delegitimize it and drive resources instead to private
approaches to education. This Article takes no position on whether such a motivation underlies the
policies described above the line, although my intuition is that most reformers are well meaning. They,
however, are aided in their efforts by privatization sentiments and interests.
78. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ESEA FLEXBILITY POLICY DOCUMENT 2 (2012),
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/eseaflex/approved-requests/flexrequest.doc (requiring states to adopt
teacher evaluation systems to receive a waiver from No Child Left Behind); Steven Brill, The
Teachers' Union's Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010
/05/23/magazine/23Race-t.html [http://perma.cc/W7Y2-UF79] (discussing the political movement to
change tenure and teacher evaluations, along with states' and istricts' move toward those ends).
79. In fact, plaintiffs' lead expert, Raj Chetty, rests his conclusions about the benefits of
terminating ineffective teachers (those whom tenure purportedly protects) on value-added statistical
modeling of students' standardized tests and teachers' effect on them. See Chetty et al., supra note 26.
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The elimination of tenure protections could simply lead to random teacher
dismissals and tenure denials under these evaluation systems, which would do
little to improve teaching quality. It could even make matters worse by further
eroding the existing and potential teaching workforce. At the very least,
unreliable teacher dismissals would likely produce a new wave of litigation by
teachers alleging that they had been denied due process. Rather than solving
the challenge of ensuring access to quality teachers, eliminating teacher tenure
might simply set off another host of problems. Yet from the perspective of
reformers, tenure is what prevents rigorous and meaningful teacher evaluation,
and the absence of rigorous and meaningful evaluation is what makes tenure so
problematic. In short, the challenge to tenure and the push to increase teacher
evaluation are intertwined. Thus, evaluating the distinct flaws in the current
value-added models and student growth percentile models is an important first
step in evaluating the constitutional challenge to tenure.
A. The Move to New Statutory Frameworks: Evaluating Teachers
Through Their Students' Standardized Test Scores
Starting in 2009, the U.S. Department of Education used competitive
grant programs to prompt states to implement data systems to track student
achievement from year to year by classroom.so States were to use that data to
evaluate individual teachers' effects on student outcomes.8' Many states
adopted those systems in hopes of securing a grant from the Department, and
those states that did not were later forced to do so. By the fall of 2011, nearly
every state and school district in the nation was in violation of NCLB's student
82achievement and teacher quality requirements. To avoid sanctions under
NCLB, states were forced to seek waivers from the Department, which agreed
83to grant those waivers only on certain conditions. In particular, states and
districts had to develop assessments that would "measure student growth" and
implement "teacher and principal evaluation and support systems" that
"meaningfully differentiate[d] [teacher] performance" into at least three levels
80. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2009)
(requiring states to build "data systems that measure student growth and success"); see also U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 6 (2010), http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/blueprint/blueprint.pdf
[http://perma.cc/75CP-PUDY].
81. RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 80, at 8-9.
82. Sam Dillon, Overriding a Key Education Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, at A12
(predicting that the number of failing schools would reach 80,000 out of 100,000 in fall 2011).
83. ESEA FLEXIBILITY POLICY DOCUMENT, supra note 78, at 1-2; see also U.S. DEP'T
EDUC., ESEA FLEXIBILITY: REQUEST FOR WINDow 3, at 10-11 (June 7, 2012), www2.ed.gov/policy
/eseaflex/approved-requests/eseaflexireqw3.doc (requiring, as a condition for receiving a waiver from
NCLB, that states adopt "college- and career-ready standards [for all students] in at least
reading/language arts and mathematics" and evelop assessments of that curriculum that "measure
student growth").
92 [Vol. 104:75
2016] THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO TEACHER TENURE
84
based on "student growth" data. School districts had to use that data in
making "personnel decisions," which could include tenure, compensation,
and retention.86 These intersecting forces resulted in entirely new teacher
evaluation systems in most states.
Between 2009 and 2012, thirty-six states and the District of Columbia
passed laws mandating the consideration of students' standardized test scores
87in teacher evaluations. Classroom observations, certifications, and other
measures may also play a role, but student test scores are non-negotiable.
Some states require test scores to count for 50 percent or more of teachers'
evaluations, while other states offer localities more flexibility, only mandating
that test scores play a "significant" role.89
Several states go further to mandate specific consequences for teachers
who receive unfavorable or below average teaching effectiveness ratings.90
Tennessee, for instance, requires that school administrators rank teachers into
one of four tiers of effectiveness.91 Only teachers ranking in the top two tiers of
effectiveness in two of their first five years of teaching receive tenure.92 A
teacher can subsequently lose tenure by falling "below expectations" on
93evaluations for two consecutive years.
These new statutory frameworks generally rely on one of two statistical
models to evaluate teachers' effectiveness: "value-added models" (VAMs) and
"student growth percentile models" (SGPs). Value-added models attempt to
estimate how a group of students would perform if all things but the teacher
were equal.94 Based on that estimate, value-added models measure whether
individual teachers help students achieve more or less than expected.95 This
serves as the basis to compare teachers to each other and determine which
84. ESEA FLEXIBILITY POLICY DOCUMENT, supra note 78, at 1, 3.
8 5. Id.
86. U.S. DEP'T EDUC., ESEA FLEXIBILITY FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 53-55 (Aug. 3,
2012), www2.ed.gov/policy/eseaflex/esea-flexibility-faqs.doc.
87. Superfine, supra note 53, at 592.
88. Baker et al., The Legal Consequences, upra note 30.
89. Student performance data must be 35 to 50 percent of teachers' evaluations in Arizona; 50
or more percent in Colorado, Florida, and Idaho; and a "significant factor" in Maine, Maryland,
Indiana, Oregon, and Illinois. Id. at 3.
90. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, STATE OF THE STATES: TRENDS AND EARLY
LESSONS ON TEACHER EVALUATION AND EFFECTIVENESS POLICIES 20 (2011); see, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 22-63-203 (West 2010); LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:442(C)(1) (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 380.1249(2)(h) (West 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-5-503 to -504 (2012).
91. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 90, at 20.
92. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-503.
93. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-504. Colorado goes much further, requiring that student
performance count as 50 percent of a teacher's evaluation and three consecutive years of improving
students' performance to receive non-probationary status. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-203.
94. Baker et al., supra note 30; Dan Goldhaber et al., Does the Model Matter? Exploring the
Relationship Between Diferent Student Achievement-Based Teacher Assessments, 1 STAT. & PUB.
POL'Y 1 (2014).
95. Hutt & Tang, supra note 36, at 449-53.
93
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
teachers "add value" to learning outcomes. Student growth percentile models
are similar in theory, but distinct in their calculations. Rather than rely on
estimates, student growth percentile models measure the actual growth that
students demonstrate on standardized tests from one school year to the next.96
That growth is then compared to the growth of students in other classrooms to
rank the growth of a teacher's students in terms of percentiles.97 Student
growth percentile models, however, do not control for student demographics
and other relevant school level factors.98 In this respect, they are no more than
raw data and not designed for assessing a teacher's effectiveness.99
B. The Practical Limits and Flaws of Using Students' Test Scores to Evaluate
Teachers
The notion that student achievement on standardized tests could be
disaggregated and correlated with teachers makes perfect sense. It comes with
the heavy allure of objectivity. If those scores and their attribution to teachers
are not objective, however, treating them as such is dangerous.00 To be clear,
collecting and studying this data certainly has the potential to drastically
enhance our understanding of teaching in the future, but scholars have
demonstrated that the current gap between theory and practical implementation
is large.
This gap is important not only to teacher evaluation in general, but also to
the current challenges to tenure. First, the current tenure challenges are
premised on the notion that schools can reliably identify teachers for retention,
96. Goldhaber et al., supra note 94.
97. Baker et al., The Legal Consequences, upra note 30.
98. See, e.g., Student Growth Percentiles FAQ, STATE OF WASH., OFF. SUPERINTENDENT
PUB. INSTRUCTION, http://www.kl2.wa.us/assessment/SGP/FAQ.aspx [http://perma.cc/RH42-Z5BW]
(last visited Oct. 29, 2015) (indicating that the basis on which students' scores are compared to one
another is their prior year test scores, with no reference to demographic controls); Student Growth
Percentiles - Georgia's Student Growth Model, GA. DEP'T EDUC., https://www.gadoe.org/School-
Improvement/Teacher-and-Leader-Effectiveness/Pages/Student-Growth-Percentiles.aspx
[https://perma.cc/U55S-KXLV] (last visited Oct. 29, 2015) (indicating Georgia's similar student score
basis); STATE OF N.J., DEP'T OF EDUC., STUDENT GROWTH PERCENTILES (2015),
http://www.nj.gov/education/AchieveNJ /teacher/SGPOverview.pdf [http://perma.cc/XF5M-KZCK]
(indicating New Jersey's similar student score basis).
99. See generally Bruce D. Baker & Joseph Oluwole, Deconstructing Disinformation on
Student Growth Percentiles & Teacher Evaluation in New Jersey, N.J. EDUC. POL'Y F. (May 2, 2013),
https://njedpolicy.wordpress.com/2013/05/02/deconstructing-disinformation-on-student-growth-
percentiles-teacher-evaluation-in-new-jersey [https://perma.cc/V85H-2DB4] (claiming that Student
Growth Percentiles are "not designed for inferring teacher influence on student outcomes," "do not
control for various factors outside of the teacher's control," and "are not backed by research on
estimating teacher effectiveness").
100. See generally John Ewing, Mathematical Intimidation: Driven by the Data, 58 NOTICES
AMS 667, 667 (2011) (leading mathematician cautioning against "mathematics employed as a
rhetorical weapon an intellectual credential to convince the public that an idea or a process is
'objective' and hence better than other competing ideas or processes" and concluding that "[t]he latest
instance of the phenomenon is valued-added modeling (VAM), used to interpret test data").
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dismissal, tenure denial, and hire based on their students' test scores. In
Vergara, for instance, the claimed benefits of teacher removal and replacement
are based on a value-added assessment of teachers.'0 ' But if this premise is
false, eliminating tenure protections and dismissing teachers based on their
students' test scores would be unlikely to improve teaching effectiveness.
Second, if these evaluation systems are not reliable, tenure may be necessary to
protect teachers from arbitrary personnel decisions and, thus, is not an
unnecessary administrative burden as plaintiffs argue. In the absence of these
protections, the possibility of violating teachers' federal constitutional due
process rights becomes more likely. In short, it is far from clear that the teacher
evaluation and retention policies that would replace tenure comply with due
process or would improve teaching. The following Sections address each of the
practical and legal flaws in value-added models and student growth percentile
models.
1. When Tests Do Not Match the Curriculum
The tests on which the data models rely are often misaligned with the
teachers whom they evaluate and the curriculum the teachers are expected to
teach. In some states, value-added models and student growth percentile
models apply to all teachers every year, even though many teachers' subjects
are not tested at all and other teachers' subjects are tested only every few
years.102 In other words, the data required to produce a value-added model or
student growth percentile model score for many teachers does not exist. Thus,
it is impossible to fairly or reliably rate those teachers.103
Alignment problems, however, can exist even for those teachers whose
subjects are tested yearly. Accurately measuring a teacher's effectiveness
requires more than just a standardized test in that teacher's subject. First, the
test must be directly aligned to the curriculum the state requires the teacher to
deliver.104  Second, the test should be designed to measure teaching
101. Plaintiffs principally rely on Raj Chetty's value-added study of teaching effectiveness. See
Chetty et al., supra note 26.
102. See, e.g., Brief of Education Law and Educational Measurement Professors as Amici
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 21-25, Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2015)
(No. 14-12506-BB); Martinez Complaint, supra note 42, at 38; Michael Winerip, In Tennessee,
Following the Rules for Evaluations Off a Cliff N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011, at A18; see also STATE OF
N.J., DEP'T OF EDUC., OVERVIEW OF STUDENT GROWTH PERCENTILE (SGP) 10 (2014),
http://www.state.nj.us/education/AchieveNJ/teacher/SGPOverviewPresentation.pdf
[http://perma.cc/55XE-RXTM] (requiring that a teacher have taught only 60 percent of the content
prior to the exam and students have attended 70 percent of the classes prior to the exam).
103. See Brief of Education Law and Educational Measurement Professors, supra note 102, at
21-25 ("[T]he model isolates the teaching performance of one teacher and attributes the responsibility
for it to another teacher a use that could not be more at odds with the model's design.").
104. See Eva L. Baker et al., Problems with the Use of Student Test Scores to Evaluate
Teachers 2, 14 (The Econ. Pol'y Inst., Briefing Paper No. 278, 2010) (indicating the misalignment of
tests and curriculum is a flaw); Michelle Croft & Richard Buddin, Applying Value-Added Methods to
Teachers in Untested Grades and Subjects, 44 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 12, 15 (2015) (discussing the problem
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effectiveness rather than student competencies.0 5  To ensure reliability,
pyschometricians construct different tests to measure different factors and
outcomes.106
The tests states are currently using to evaluate teachers do not meet either
of these criteria. Several states have relied on exams that are not tied to the
actual state curriculum,107 and none of these tests were designed to assess
teachers.1os They were designed to assess students. Tests designed to assess
students surely overlap with those designed to assess teachers, but they are not
the same. The effect of using a test designed for alternate purposes can be
enormous. An examination of two different sets of test scores in Texas, for
instance, showed that teachers can regularly rank as highly effective on one test
but rank ineffective on another.109 In short, student scores on standardized tests
are not inherently reliable measures of teaching effectiveness. They are the
opposite if they are not properly designed and aligned.
of assessing teachers in untested subjects and writing that "assessments should be aligned with the
district's curriculum to accurately measure whether students are learning the material taught in the
classroom"); see also Anderson v. Banks, 540 F. Supp. 761, 761-63 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (bringing a due
process challenge to high stakes testing, focusing on the factual question of whether students had been
taught the material on which they were tested).
105. See Baker et al., supra note 30, at 14-17 (discussing the need for evaluations to assess
teaching effectiveness and the difficulty in attributing student achievement gains or losses to the
teacher rather than student factors); Superfine, supra note 53, at 608-09 (discussing the unreliability of
new evaluation systems in assessing teaching effectiveness due to the fact that they do "not account for
the characteristics of students that can influence the progress students make"); see also ESEA
FLEXIBILITY FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 86, at 32-37 (discussing the required
alignment between standards, curriculum, and student assessment to receive an NCLB waiver); RACE
TO THE ToP PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 80, at 13 (requiring high quality
assessments and defining them as "an assessment designed to measure a student's knowledge,
understanding of, and ability," "enable measurement of student achievement ... and student growth
(as defined in this notice)," and are "of high technical quality (e.g., be valid, reliable, fair, and aligned
to standards)").
106. See Superfine, supra note 53, at 607-08.
107. See, e.g., Cook, 792 F.3d at 1297-98 (describing three different categories of teachers who
were subject to Florida's value-added model and indicating that one category of teachers taught
subjects that were not tested at all and another category taught subjects that were not tested every
year); Croft & Buddin, supra note 104, at 11-17, 20 (discussing the challenge of evaluating teachers
based on test scores in untested subjects and the lawsuits this might trigger); see also Audrey R. Lynn,
Teacher Evaluations Based on Student Testing: Missing an Opportunity for True Education Reform,
18 TEX. J. CIV. LIBERTIES & CIV. RGTS. 203, 230 (2013) (discussing the problem of the differential
sequencing in curriculum across schools when the exam assumes uniformity).
108. See Superfine, supra note 53, at 607-08.
109. See, e.g., MOSHE ADLER, NAT'L EDUC. POLICY CTR., REVIEW OF MEASURING THE
IMPACTS OF TEACHERS 7 (2014), http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/ttr-chetty-teachimpacts_0.pdf
[http://perma.cc/V5JH-XJR4] (discussing research demonstrating hat different tests can produce
different results); SEAN P. CORCORAN, ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, CAN TEACHERS BE
EVALUATED BY THEIR STUDENTS' TEST SCORES? SHOULD THEY BE? THE USE OF VALUE-ADDED
MEASURES OF TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 13 (2010).
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2. Failing to Account for Demographic and Other Variables
Curriculum alignment and test design are susceptible to correction, but
accounting for the variables necessary to draw fine distinctions between
teachers is more difficult. Student test scores alone reveal almost nothing
meaningful about a teacher's role in students' growth. Test scores must first be
disaggregated by demographic and other variables." 0 On average, low-income
students, students with disabilities, English Language Learners, and racial
minorities score lower on exams and make less academic progress from year to
year than other students."' Thus, regardless of teaching quality, teachers with
disproportionate numbers of these students will, on average, see less raw
growth than other teachers. To measure actual teaching effectiveness, statistical
models must account for and disaggregate these and other factors.112 Those
states that do not fully account for student demographics in their models are
measuring students' preexisting knowledge, aptitude, and familial advantages,
not teaching effectiveness.'13
Student growth percentile models do not explicitly account for these
demographic variables. Instead, they either compare ll students to one another
or compare students with similar scores on a prior exam to one another.114
Thus, at best, these models are a basis for comparing students to one another.
Scholars reason that, without demographic controls, student growth percentile
models are facially invalid when attributed to teachers. 115
110. See generally Laura McNeal, Total Recall: The Rise and Fall of Teacher Tenure, 30
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 489, 506 (2013).
111. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2009, at 31
fig. 12.1(2009), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009081.pdf [http://perma.cc/4HTJ-HL3S].
112. See AM. INST. FOR RESEARCH, 2011-2012 GROwTH MODEL FOR EDUCATOR
EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT: FINAL (2012); Baker et al., supra note 30, at 8, 9, 16 (exploring
biases in value-added models that result from demographic differences in student body populations
and noting the serious problems that result from student growth percentile models' failure to account
for any demographic variances); Jesse Rothstein, Student Sorting and Bias in Value-Added
Estimation: Selection on Observables and Unobservables, 4 EDUC. FIN. & POL'Y 537, 538 (2009)
(discussing how the student variable makes it difficult to fairly compare teachers).
113. Even in New York, where the model attempted to control for student demographics,
teachers with more low-income students still, on average, had lower growth percentiles. AM. INST. FOR
RESEARCH, supra note 112, at 1.
114. See, e.g., GA. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 98; ST. OF WASH., supra note 98.
115. Baker & Oluwole, supra note 99; Mark Ehlert et al., Selecting Growth Measures for
School and Teacher Evaluations 23 (Nat'l Ctr. for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Educ. Research,
Working Paper No. 80, 2012) ("Although [Student Growth Percentiles] are currently employed for
this purpose by several states, we argue that hey [] cannot be used for causal inference (nor were they
designed to be used as such)."); Bruce D. Baker, Rebutting (Again) the Persistent Flow of





States' value-added models account for some student demographic
factors, but still miss other variables.116 Studies indicate that unusual progress,
or lack thereof, in an individual student's scores from one year to the next is
more likely attributable to a student's personal circumstances outside of school
or some other random variable, such as the particular test taken, subject matter,
or statistical method employed, than the teacher."7  Most notable,
homelessness, unemployment, divorce, tutors, after-school programs, and
summer programs can drastically change an individual student's
achievement."8 Neither value-added models nor student growth percentile
models account for variables of this sort.119 In short, value-added models and
student growth percentile models, as currently implemented, are more a
measure of student demographics and out-of-school factors than teaching
effectiveness.
3. The Instability of Effectiveness Ratings Across Years and Metrics
Variations in teachers' value-added model and student growth percentile
model scores across years reinforce the point advanced in the prior Section-
that the models capture insufficient data to assess teaching effectiveness-and
that they are highly unreliable. Teachers' effectiveness ratings are determined
in the first year data becomes available, but the databases are longitudinal and
expand in following years as additional data becomes available.120 Subsequent
data in year three, for instance, can be used to change the calculation of a
teacher's effectiveness for year one.121 These changes are, in part, explained by
116. See generally DANIEL F. MCCAFFREY ET AL., RAND EDUC., EVALUATING VALUE-
ADDED MODELS FOR TEACHER ACCOUNTABILITY, at xvi-xvii (2004),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MGl58.html [http://perma.cc/S62V-LBX4].
117. See BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., LEARNING ABOUT TEACHING: INITIAL FINDINGS
FROM THE MEASURES OF EFFECTIVE TEACHING PROJECT 8 (2010),
http://www.metproject.org/downloads/PreliminaryFindings-Research Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/V7
B6-DRHE]; Sarah Theule Lubienski & Corinna Crawford Crane, Beyond Free Lunch: Which Family
Background Measures Matter?, EDUC. POL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, May 25, 2010, at 1, 21 (finding
that "the degree parents expected the child to obtain, lunch-program eligibility, [] music lessons[, t]he
number of books the child had, the number of children in the household, [] whether the child had
speech problems[,] . .. [the m]other's age at first birth and [the] child's hearing problems" were
statistically significant in predicting student math and reading achievement in elementary school);
Rothstein, supra note 112 at 537, 565-66 (finding that variances in student achievement between
teachers are influenced by classroom assignments that principals make based on factors that are
unobservable in data).
118. See supra note 117.
119. Controlling for these factors may be impossible for obvious reasons. Of course, other
education studies rely on this same data, but they do not attempt to isolate the results of individual
students and teachers in the ways value-added models and student growth percentile models do.
120. See generally RACE TO THE ToP PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 80, at 3-5,
8-9 (promoting longitudinal data systems to track student growth and assess teaching effectiveness).
121. See, e.g., LINDA WESSON ET AL., TENN. COMP. OF THE TREAS., USE OF VALUE-ADDED IN
TEACHER EVALUATIONS: KEY CONCEPTS AND STATE PROFILES 34 (2015) ("[E]ach year of additional
test scores is accumulated to provide more precise estimates of each student's NCE (percentile-like)
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missing and variable data from year to year and, in part, by the fact that the
available data is simply misinterpreted by the statistical model.122 The result is
that a value-added model can identify a teacher as high performing in 2014,
only to change that identification to average performing when additional data is
incorporated in 2016.123 Studies have already shown that it is common for a
teacher's rating for a previous year to change significantly after the fact, which
begs the question of how a value-added model or student growth percentile
model could be a reliable basis upon which to tenure or terminate a teacher.124
A teacher could have been terminated based on an ineffectiveness rating in
2014, only to have that rating change to average the next year. In short, while
teachers' actual effectiveness in the classroom is set by the end of the school
year, the various conclusions one might draw based on statistical analysis of
their students' test scores are not.
4. Setting Arbitrary Cut-Off Scores for Teaching Effectiveness
The problem of year-to-year variations is further exacerbated by arbitrary
cut-off points in the statistical models. The models will identify student growth
or value-added teaching, but policy makers and administrators must still label a
particular amount of growth or value added sufficient or insufficient, and
teachers as effective or ineffective.125 Assume, for instance, that a school's
entire teaching staff was normatively effective. The models would still identify
a group of bottom percentile teachers. But being in the bottom 25 percent is not
any more inherently indicative of being ineffective than is being in the top 75
ranking ... [resulting in a] re-estimation of teachers' value-added scores."), http://www.comptroller
.tn.gov/Repository/RE/ValueAdded2015.pdf.
122. MCCAFFREY ET AL., supra note 116, at xvi-xvii (noting that value-added model results are
distorted and "confound[ed] by influences other than teachers on student learning that are incorrectly
modeled or are not modeled at all for example, a model that does not properly distinguish the effects
of teachers from other effects of the school in which the teacher works").
123. See WESSON ET AL., supra note 121; see also Baker et al., supra note 104, at 2 ("[Value-
added model] estimates have proven to be unstable across statistical models, years, and classes that
teachers teach. One study found that across five large urban districts, among teachers who were anked
in the top 20% of effectiveness in the first year, fewer than a third were in that top group the next year,
and another third moved all the way down to the bottom 40%. Another found that teachers'
effectiveness ratings in one year could only predict from 4% to 16% of the variation in such ratings in
the following year.").
124. Daniel F. McCaffrey et al., The Intertemporal Variability of Teacher Effect Estimates, 4
EDUC. FIN. & POL'Y 572, 585-98 (2009). It is also worth noting that the data that the models intend to
include is not always complete, which also reduces its reliability for individual teachers. See ADLER,
supra note 109, at 6-7 (discussing research finding instability of value-added model scores across
years); Baker et al., supra note 30.
125. See Baker et al., supra note 30; Ewing, supra note 100, at 671 ("Are those teachers
identified as superior (or inferior) by value-added models actually superior (or inferior)? This is
perhaps the shakiest part of [the value-added model]. There has been surprisingly little effort to
compare valued-added rankings to other measures of teacher quality, and to the extent that informal
comparisons are made (as in the LA Times article), they sometimes don't agree with common sense.").
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percent necessarily indicative of effectiveness. 126 Rather, the cut-off points
currently used to label teachers as effective or ineffective are arbitrary and
lacking any social science or research basis.
The practical result is that in locales with high cut-off points, the state
may be labeling a significant number of teachers as ineffective, even though
they are performing satisfactorily by other normative measures. For instance,
according to a new lawsuit in Texas, several of the teachers whom Houston's
new student growth percentile model had identified as ineffective were
previously identified by the district as high performing under pre-student
growth percentile model methods.127 By requiring multiple years of poor value-
added model or student growth percentile model scores prior to any negative
action against a teacher, several states also effectively concede that being in the
bottom quartile of a student growth percentile model or below average on a
value-added model does not necessarily equate with ineffective teaching.
Likewise, in an attempt to minimize unreliability, most states also require
actual observations of classroom teachers prior to termination or demotion.128
But placing less weight on test scores does not cure the fundamental
arbitrariness of the cut-off itself'129 Nor does it change the fact that value-added
model and student growth percentile model scores still tend to play a decisive
role in overall teacher evaluations.130 In short, unreliable student growth
percentile model and value-added model scores can infect the entire teacher
evaluation system in a way that is not easily undone.
126. See id. For instance, in Miami-Dade County in 2011-12, the school district literally
negotiated the value-added model designations with teachers, drastically increasing the percentage it
would label as highly effective to 30.60 percent, while also reducing the percentage it would label as
ineffective from 7 percent down to less than 1 percent. See UNITED TEACHERS OF DADE, VAM
BARGAINING (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.utd.org/filedownload/1243/VAM+Progression.pptx.
127. Plaintiffs' Original Complaint, Hous. Fed'n of Teachers v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., No.
4:2014cv01189 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Hous. Fed'n of Teachers Complaint]. In fact,
the district had recognized one of its teachers as award-winning just one year prior to ranking him as
low-performing based on his student growth percentile model. Id.
128. See Superfine, supra note 53, at 609.
129. Baker et al., supra note 30, at 5-6.
130. Id.; see also ESEA FLEXIBILITY POLICY DOCUMENT, supra note 78, at 3 (requiring states
to treat student growth as a "significant factor" in teacher evaluations to receive an NCLB waiver).
Moreover, initial research suggests that when an administrator is aware that a teacher has already
received a low student growth percentile model or value-added model score, the administrator's in-
class observations of the teacher may be negatively biased. See, e.g., GROVER J. (Russ) WHITEHURST
ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INST., EVALUATING TEACHERS WITH CLASSROOM OBSERVATIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED IN FOUR DISTRICTS 11-19 (2014) (finding "inclusion in individual teacher
evaluation scores of a school value-added component negatively impacts good teachers in bad schools
and positively impacts bad teachers in good schools" and that observations often remain steady over
time regardless of subsequent student scores); see also LAUREN SARTAIN ET AL., UNIV. OF CHI.
URBAN EDUC. INST., RETHINKING TEACHER EVALUATION: FINDINGS FROM THE FIRST YEAR OF THE
EXCELLENCE IN TEACHING PROJECT IN CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS 9 (2010) (noting inconsistency in
the principals' evaluations of teachers versus those of external reviewers, as principals consistently
rated teachers higher on some measures and lower on others).
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5. Conflating Statistical Correlation with Actual Causation
Overall, the way in which states use value-added model and student
growth percentile model scores indicates a failure to distinguish between
statistical correlation and causation. First, the strength of the statistical
correlation is of concern. Given the numerous flaws noted above, the strength
of the correlations and statistical significance of those correlations are sure to
be low in many instances. Second, even if being in a particular teacher's class
might correlate with leaming growth, the correlation does not necessarily mean
that the teacher, or his or her teaching effectiveness, is the cause of student
growth or its absence.131 Correlation is just that-a correlation. Causation is the
inference that decision makers choose to make.132
That causal inference is fraught with "many pitfalls [given] the kinds of
data available from typical school districts." 33 Even if data problems could be
cured, "no statistical model, however complex, and no method of analysis,
however sophisticated, can fully compensate for the lack of randomization."134
Thus, "treating the output of a value-added analysis as an accurate indicator of
a teacher's relative contribution to student leaming is equivalent to making a
causal interpretation of a statistical estimate."135
The current evaluation models, nonetheless, suggest a firm belief that
correlation means causation, rather than simply offering a piece of
circumstantial evidence to weigh.136 They suggest little, if any, recognition of
the possibility that a correlation between a teacher or set of teachers and the
standardized test scores of their students is caused by some other observed or
unobserved phenomenon.
In sum, policy makers and states shifted teacher evaluation to new
statistical models based on the assumption that the models would add a level of
objectivity and reliability previously missing, and make it possible to identify
and remove ineffective teachers. In the abstract, these assumptions are entirely
131. See C. Kirabo Jackson & Elias Bruegmann, Teaching Students and Teaching Each Other:
The Importance ofPeer Learning for Teachers, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., Oct. 2009, at 85; Cory
Koedel, An Empirical Analysis of Teacher Spillover Effects in Secondary School, 28 ECON. EDUC.
REV. 682 (2009). A major report by RAND Education explained early on some of the issues with
value-added models. See MCCAFFREY ET AL., supra note 116, at xvi-xvii ("Because true teacher
effects might be correlated with the characteristics of the students they teach, current VAM approaches
cannot separate any existing contextual effects from these true teacher effects.").
132. See generally HENRY I. BRAUN, EDUC. TESTING SERV., USING STUDENT PROGRESS To
EVALUATE TEACHERS: A PRIMER ON VALUE-ADDED MODELS 7-8 (2005), http://www.ets.org
/Media/Research/pdf/PICVAM.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZU5E-B2UR] ("A problem arises because the
word 'effectiveness' denotes a causal interpretation . .. [and the] assumptions required to justify
endowing the estimated teacher effects with a causal interpretation . .. are usually not made explicit.").
133. Ewing, supra note 100, at 671.
134. BRAUN, supra note 132, at 8.
135. Id. at 3.
136. See id. at 8 (claiming that "[d]evelopers of VAM software and those who employ the
results rarely acknowledge the implications of the fundamental problem" and instead make implicit
assumptions without any real credible or plausible basis).
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reasonable. But statistical approaches, even if generally appropriate, require
careful implementation and testing to ensure their valid use in a particular
context. States have neither tested the models prior to implementation, nor
carefully implemented them. Scholars and empirical evidence have now
demonstrated that these new teacher evaluation methods are seriously flawed.
As discussed later, these flaws also strike at one of the fact predicates of the
constitutional challenge to tenure: that states can systematically and reliably
identify ineffective teachers for removal.
C. The Conflict Between Constitutional Due Process and Data-Driven
Evaluation
Over the past two years, teachers have filed several legal challenges to
changes in teacher evaluation, terms of employment, and tenure.137 These
challenges potentially implicate three distinct legal rights: (1) prohibitions
against impairment of contract, (2) collective bargaining, and (3) due process
protections. Teacher tenure and evaluation changes have been heavily litigated
in the past. Most courts routinely reject challenges based on the Contracts
Clausel38 and collective bargaining.139 Thus, those claims warrant little
discussion here. But due process requirements of fair notice, an opportunity to
respond to purported ineffective teaching, and evaluations free from
arbitrariness present more fundamental limitations to the use of value-added
models and student growth percentile models.
The following Sections discuss each of these due process limitations,
separating them into the categories of procedural and substantive requirements.
Procedurally, due process ensures that a tenured teacher cannot be terminated
without the state making a case against the teacher and allowing the teacher a
chance to respond. Substantively, due process limits the reasons why a school
might remove a teacher and the reliability of the evidence on which a district
might do so.
137. See, e.g., Hous. Fed'n of Teachers Complaint, supra note 127; Masters v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,
No. 2014CV30371 (Colo. Super. Ct. June 6, 2014); N.C. Ass'n of Educators v. State, No. 13 CVS
16240, 2014 WL 4952101 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 6, 2014).
138. Courts presume that legislatures do not intend to create contractual rights in statutes. Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 466 (1985). Even when
legislatures intend to create contracts, courts afford legislatures significant leeway in altering those
rights when necessary to achieve important state goals, such as improving education. See, e.g., Balt.
Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1015 (4th Cir. 1993); Madison Teachers, Inc. v.
Walker, 851 N.W.2d 337 (Wis. 2014); see also Parkinson, supra note 41, at 860; Chris E. Vance,
Teacher Competency Testing: "Decertification" and the Federal Constitution and Title VII, 37
EMoRY L.J. 1077, 1102-12 (1988).
139. Collective bargaining presents political problems for the state, not legal ones. Teachers'
constitutional and statutory rights to bargaining do not guarantee teachers preferential employment
terms, only the right to bargain for those terms. Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441
U.S. 463, 465 (1979). Teachers' unions have been successful because of their political rather than legal
strength. See generally Dagostino, supra note 59.
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1. The Right to Notice and a Chance to Respond
Teachers' due process rights stem from a property right in their jobs.140
Tenure, however, is not a right to "a lifetime job, [but it] affords certain legal
protections to a teacher in order to prevent summary and groundless
dismissals."141 Due process requires that teachers receive notice of any grounds
for dismissal that a district might bring, the evidence supporting those grounds,
and a chance to respond.142 States and localities generally retain the power to
change certain terms of employment, such as certification requirements.
However, to the extent those terms require teachers to meet new conditions to
retain their jobs, due process also requires advance notice of those changes so
that teachers have time to comply with new requirements before becoming
subject to any negative action.
In a typical state, notice of termination and a chance to respond are
afforded through formal procedures. The superintendent or principal provides a
teacher with written notice of the intent to terminate or demote, including the
specific statutory grounds on which he believes the action is justified. 143 The
teacher then has the right to contest the action in a number of forums: a
meeting with the superintendent or principal, a formal hearing before a hearing
officer and/or the school board, and an appeal to a court.144
No matter how good a school's case for terminating an ineffective tenured
teacher, it must go through processes of this sort. Moreover, some states, or
local interpretations of state law, afford teachers an opportunity to remedy their
teaching deficiencies.145 Only after failed remediation can a teacher be
terminated.146 None of the procedures create a bar to changes in teacher
evaluation, but they mandate specific procedures for enforcing those changes if
they are going to be a basis for removing teachers.
2. The Need for Fair, Accurate, and Reliable Termination Processes
Substantive due process ensures some minimal level of fairness and logic
in the decision to terminate a teacher. It protects teachers from arbitrary,
capricious, and insufficiently substantiated eprivations of property, even if all
140. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
141. Powell, supra note 37, at 1075 ("[T]he creation of a property interest and the
corresponding right to procedural due process does not guarantee [lifetime employment]."); Monica
Teixeira de Sousa, The State of Our Unions: How President Obama's Education Reforms Threaten
the Working Class, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 201 (2011).
142. Parkinson, supra note 41, at 863-70.
143. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-325 (2012).
144. See id.
145. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-25-440 (2014) (requiring principal to "to assist the teacher
to correct whatever appears to be the cause of potential dismissal [and] allow reasonable time for
improvement"); see also Powell, supra note 37.
146. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-25-440 (2014).
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the correct procedures are followed.147 In the context of teacher evaluations,
this means that evaluation methods, such as value-added models and student
growth percentile models, should produce reliable results.14 8 While courts defer
to districts' professional determination that a teacher is incompetent or
ineffective and to the decision to select particular measures of competence and
effectiveness, the measures should have some reasonable and reliable
connection to actual teaching effectiveness.149
Due process litigation of value-added models and student growth
percentile models is in its earliest stages, but several scholars reason that
student testing cases will structure the adjudication.15 0 Those cases require the
test to be a "valid" assessment of the skills or knowledge the state is seeking to
measure. In a leading case, Debra P. v. Turlington,'5 ' the Fifth Circuit
emphasized that "content validity [is] most important for a competency
examination.... In the field of competency testing, an important component of
content validity is curricular validity, defined . . . as 'things that are currently
taught.""152 The court held that fundamental fairness under due process
required that the state demonstrate "that the test administered measures what
was actually taught in the schools."53
A number of lower courts and scholars have further inferred that due
process requires specific forms of validity beyond simply testing what is
taught.154 To be valid, a test should accurately measure the skills and content
that it seeks to test. 1 In other words, a low score on a standardized reading
147. See Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, 404 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981) (stating that
government action violates substantive due process if it is "arbitrary and capricious, does not achieve
or even frustrates a legitimate state interest, or is fundamentally unfair"); Parkinson, supra note 41, at
871.
148. Baker et al., supra note 30, at 10-11; see also Armstead v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch.
Dist., 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972); York v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 581 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ala.
1983); Ga. Ass'n of Educators v. Nix, 407 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
149. Parkinson, supra note 41, at 853 (finding that courts vary in the level of rigor they apply in
validation analysis).
150. See Baker et al., supra note 30, at 17-18 (relying on Debra P. and one case that followed it
to structure the legal analysis); Preston C. Green III et al., The Legal and Policy Implications of Value-
Added Teacher Assessment Policies, 2012 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 1; see also Vance, supra note 138, at
1092.
151. 644 F.2d 397.
152. Id. at 405.
153. Id. at 404-06.
154. See, e.g., United States v. LULAC, 793 F.2d 636, 639 (5th Cir. 1986) (discussing test
validation analysis); United States v. Texas, 628 F. Supp. 304, 320-21 (E.D. Tex. 1985), rev'd sub
nom. United States v. LULAC, 793 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1986) (discussing test validation analysis); see
also Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 1984); G.I. Forum v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 87 F.
Supp. 2d 667 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (requiring testing regime to comport with professional standards).
Scholars also point to employment discrimination cases that require test validity. See, e.g., Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). While
those cases do not control due process analysis, they bear directly on what a reliable and fair test is.
155. See LULAC, 793 F.2d at 639 (discussing test validity); Brookhart v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ.,
697 F.2d 179, 184-87 (7th Cir. 1983). See generally Superfine, supra note 53; U.S. DEP'T EDUC., THE
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exam should actually reflect a current lack of reading skill and knowledge,
rather than inadvertently testing other skills and knowledge that deflate or
inflate a student's score.
Some courts, however, have resisted detailed analysis of student exams,
asking only the general question of whether administering the exam is
rationally related to some legitimate educational goal of the state.156 Under this
generalized approach, some courts have been willing to find that although an
exam might lack full technical validity, the exam was rationally related to the
state's goal of improving teacher quality or effectiveness.5 7 This approach and
conclusion may be more reflective of judicial reluctance to upset public policy
and enter a political thicket than sound legal reasoning. If so, the politics and
policy surrounding student growth percentile models and value-added models
are just as prevalent.5 8
Save complete judicial abdication, however, even the most basic analysis
should place some limits on how value-added models and student growth
percentile models are used. Some of the current flaws in the value-added
models and student growth percentile models are so fundamental that even the
most rudimentary due process analysis would raise concerns. For instance,
applying student growth percentile models and value-added models to teachers
whose subjects do not appear on state standardized exams would clearly violate
the basic concept of curricular validity. Even if it did not violate curricular
validity, applying models to teachers under those circumstances would likely
USE OF TESTS AS PART OF HIGH-STAKES DECISION-MAKING FOR STUDENTS: A RESOURCE GUIDE
FOR EDUCATORS AND POLICY-MAKERS 20, 66 (2000).
156. Parkinson, supra note 41, at 871-72 (discussing cases).
157. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978); United States v. South
Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1107-09 (D.S.C. 1977). But see Ga. Ass'n of Educators v. Nix, 407 F.
Supp. 1102 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (holding that the failure to validate the test based on its purpose violated
equal protection).
158. As this Article was moving to press, for instance, the Eleventh Circuit decided a challenge
to Florida's value-added approach to teacher evaluations in Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir.
2015). The court's opinion appears heavily influenced by the larger policy questions surrounding
value-added models. The court was willing to find the evaluation system constitutional
notwithstanding the fact that not all teachers' subjects are tested each year. See id. As a result, some
teachers are evaluated not on how students scored in the subjects they taught, but how students scored
in subjects taught by other teachers. The court held this was a rational policy because its purpose was
to "increas[e] student academic performance by improving the quality of instructional, administrative,
and supervisory services in the public schools of the state." Id. at 1301 (citing FLA. STAT.
§ 1012.34(1)(a) (2015)). The court reasoned that the value-added model "may not be the best
method-or may even be a poor one for achieving [the state's] goal, [but] it is still rational to think
that the challenged evaluation procedures would advance the government's stated purpose." Id. This
approach entirely ignores questions of test validity and due process fairness to teachers and instead
simply focuses on whether the policy might have some marginal relationship to the state's goals. See
also New Mexico ex rel Stewart v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep't, No. D-101-CV-2015-00409 (N.M. Dec. 2,
2015) (enjoining New Mexico's evaluation system).
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violate any concept of due process fairness a court could articulate.159 The
states' goals of improving learning and teaching are certainly legitimate, but
holding a teacher accountable for what a student learns in someone else's
classroom is irrational because the teacher has almost zero control over what
happens in other classrooms. Control aside, however, a social studies teacher,
for instance, might have no competency to support or critique what is taught in
geometry or biology class. Thus, the teacher lacks the ability to directly or
indirectly influence learning. Similar conclusions should also follow if a
teacher's subject matter appears on the relevant standardized test, but the test
covers material that is different from the curriculum the state requires a teacher
to deliver.
Those courts applying more detailed validity analysis to student growth
percentile models and value-added models would find several additional
technical flaws in the models. First, the tests have not been validated as
accurate measurements of teaching effectiveness. To the contrary, that
teachers' scores change so much from year to year, require revision after the
fact, and lack sufficient demographic and variable controls strongly suggest
that either the evaluation models or the exams upon which they rely are invalid.
Second, even if the models might accurately measure teaching
effectiveness, states have not validated the cut-off scores embedded in the
models. In other words, demonstrating that one teacher is more effective than
another or is in some particular percentile does not demonstrate that the teacher
is effective or ineffective. To be valid, a state would need to demonstrate that
the model's cut-off points accurately distinguish between effective and
ineffective teachers.
Third, these validity problems bleed into procedural due process
problems. Value-added and student growth percentile models do not identify
actual aspects of a teacher's classroom performance, preparation, or pedagogy
that are ineffective. They merely offer statistical data outputs of how one
teacher's entire class scored on a standardized exam compared to other
teachers' classes. Statutes, case law, and labor contracts generally require
notice of the teaching deficiency that is the basis for negative action and an
opportunity to remediate. However, informing a teacher that a statistical model
has labeled the teacher ineffective because students' scores are low is not
notice of a particular instructional deficiency that a teacher needs to address.
Thus, the models may leave a teacher uncertain as to how to respond or
remediate the problem. Of course, the state might insist that the models identify
the deficiency insufficiently effective teaching to produce the expected
student outcomes-and offer a chance to respond by allowing another year for
the teacher to improve student outcomes. While a deferential court might
159. The Eleventh Circuit in Cook was only able to uphold an evaluation system that rated
teachers on subjects they did not teach by effectively avoiding the question of validity altogether. See
supra note 158.
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accept this defense, past notice requirements have required more specificity. It
has never been enough to say, for instance, that a teacher is "incompetent"
without giving some indication of what makes the teacher incompetent and/or
how the teacher failed to remediate himself.
3. Connecting Due Process to the Constitutional Challenge to Tenure
Of the three legal challenges that teachers might lodge against value-
added models and student growth percentile models, due process is the most
likely to succeed. Due process does not present any per se bar to the new
systems, but if value-added models and student growth percentile models are to
be a basis upon which to terminate teachers or alter their legal status, due
process requires a level of calibration between student tests, the statistical
models, and what is taught in the classroom. While the exact level of
calibration may vary by court, the current systems suffer from flaws so
fundamentally unfair and illogical that they would likely fail under any
reasoned analysis.
The limitations that due process imposes on teacher evaluations intersect
with the primary question this Article addresses whether tenure and other
teacher rights violate students' constitutional right to education. Reformers
have sought to achieve through litigation what they have been unable to
achieve through the political process: the elimination or restriction of tenure.
They have argued that tenure and retention policies violate students' right to an
adequate and equitable education. If tenure were removed or restricted, states'
and schools' ability to evaluate teachers based on student test scores and to
hire, retain, and fire them on that basis potentially increase. In these respects,
eliminating tenure and evaluating teachers are part of a singular effort to reform
teaching.
This tenure agenda, however, places far too much faith in the accuracy
and legality of value-added models and student growth percentile models. As
the foregoing Sections demonstrate, drawing inferences about a teacher's
effectiveness based on students' test scores is not an exact science and is prone
to error. For this reason, they may also violate teachers' due process rights.
Yet, the constitutional challenge to tenure amplifies the importance of errors
because it assumes that the systems can identify those teachers to be dismissed
and those to be hired to replace them. As the following Sections will further
demonstrate, the challenge to tenure also replicates many of the
oversimplifications regarding the causes of ineffective teaching and poor
student performance found in value-added and student growth percentile
models. In other words, the legal theory challenging tenure cannot operate in a
vacuum. It operates within a larger education policy context. Any changes to
tenure and evaluation that equity or adequacy rights might demand must still
make sense, as well as comply with due process principles. This context
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suggests the options for teacher evaluation and termination are not nearly as
broad as reform litigators might assume.
III.
TEACHER TENURE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To
EDUCATION
The right to education embedded in the fifty state constitutions and the
states' duty to deliver it has consistently grown more robust over the past four
decades. Prior to the 1970s, no court recognized state constitutions as
guaranteeing any substantive education obligations on the part of the state.
Afterward, many courts held that state education clauses were enforceable.
Those rights and duties morphed from an emphasis on roughly equal funding
across districts, to adequate funding based on student need, to an overall quality
education that prepares students for the future.160 As this morphing suggests,
the push of litigants has been to expand students' rights and states' duties, so as
to further improve educational opportunities. The constitutional challenge to
teacher tenure seeks to build on those rights and duties but use them in an
entirely new way.161
Prior litigation to enforce the constitutional right to and duty of education
focused on the broadest aspects of education and the structural means through
which to equalize and improve it. As a practical matter, that meant two things:
(1) ensuring equal or adequate access to the financial resources necessary to
purchase the core components of education and (2) relying on state leadership
to set and enforce standards for the delivery and implementation of those
resources. While successful litigation on these points thrust enormous duties on
the state, the details of educational policy, implementation, and funding were
almost always left to the state's discretion.
In contrast, the constitutional challenge to tenure seeks to dictate narrow
educational policy. In fact, the current claims ignore larger policy. They do not
challenge funding or education standards. They seek one thing-the ability to
remove teachers. On multiple levels, this is the opposite of what prior litigation
demanded. Prior litigation generally sought o reform the overall education
160. Nipun Kant, Teachers, School Spending, and Educational Achievement: Toward a New
Wave of School Quality Litigation (Spring 2014) (unpublished J.D. article, Yale Law School),
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/studentpapers/130 [http://perma.cc/774C-R8KK] (analyzing
Vergara before the decision was issued).
161. This paragraph uses both "rights" and "duties" to discuss school finance precedent for the
sake of avoiding the doctrinal issues that flow from using just one term. Scott Bauries aptly points out
the distinction between rights and duties in the context of school finance precedent, and argues that
courts have recognized state duties but not necessarily individual rights. Bauries, supra note 31. This
distinction could have particular importance in the context of the constitutional challenge to tenure and
is discussed further in later Sections of this Article, although this Article does not necessarily concede
that the constitutional duty to deliver education does not include ancillary rights on the part of students.
See Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(arguing that he duty does include rights).
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system rather than just one aspect of it. The doctrinal question is whether these
theoretical distinctions-or any others matter. If not, a factual question still
remains: do tenure laws cause substantial and systematic education inequalities
and inadequacies? A similar subsidiary question also remains with seniority
laws, which plaintiffs also challenge.
The answers to these questions will, of course, depend on the exact
precedent and facts of each particular state, but the constitutional rights and
duties at stake, the framework for adjudicating them, and the claims that
plaintiffs intend to make are sufficiently synonymous that the same legal
questions and factual hurdles will likely arise in any state. These similarities,
moreover, are borne out by past scholarship that has organized school funding
litigation into historical waves and categories.
Part III.A identifies those waves and their legal premises. Part III.B
explores the goals prior litigation has sought to achieve. Part III.C extracts a
common legal framework from past cases that extends across any particular
jurisdiction, including the evidence courts require to sustain a constitutional
claim and the circumstances under which a court will and will not intervene in
education policy. Part III.D examines the constitutional theory of teacher tenure
challenges and how it fits within existing precedent. Part III.E identifies the
flaws in the constitutional challenge to teacher tenure. Finally, Part III.F
identifies the potential merit in the related challenge to seniority systems,
which require that senior teachers be retained and newer ones dismissed during
reductions in force, regardless of teaching efficacy.
A. Historical Development of Constitutional Rights to Education
The first wave of school finance litigation reached the United States
Supreme Court, but proved the least important. In San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,162 plaintiffs argued that funding inequalities based
on local property taxes violated students' rights on two bases: (1) education is a
fundamental right under the Federal Constitution, and (2) poor students are a
suspect class, against whom the funding structure discriminates.163 Plaintiffs'
underlying theory was that all students are roughly equal, should be treated as
equal, and are entitled to resource equity. The Supreme Court rejected this
theory, holding that education is not a fundamental right and that poverty is not
a suspect class.164 This holding led advocates to abandon school funding
litigation in the federal courts and move to a second phase in state courts.
In state courts, advocates brought claims that were theoretically and
factually the same as those in Rodriguez, but the claims proceeded under the
education and equal protection clauses in state constitutions.165 They were
162. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
163. Id. at 17.
164. Id. at 18.
165. See Thro, supra note 7.
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immediately successful. The California Supreme Court held that education was
a fundamental right under the California Constitution and that funding
inequalities violated that right.166 New Jersey's Supreme Court likewise held
that funding inequities violated students' state constitutional right to a
"thorough and efficient" education.167 With California and New Jersey leading
the analytical way, courts in Arkansas, Connecticut, Washington, and
Wyoming shortly thereafter recognized a fundamental right to education under
their respective state constitutions.168
This second wave of litigation eventually raised issues beyond absolute
equity in funding. Evolving concepts of equity recognized that some students,
particularly poor students, have greater learning needs and require more
educational resources to achieve at the same level as others.169 In addition,
because most poor children live in property-poor school districts located in
rural areas and inner cities, their districts need more resources than others.17 0
The difficulty of incorporating these realities into absolute equity, along with
stiff political opposition to radical redistribution of resources along strictly
equitable lines, helped prompt a third wave of litigation.
The third wave of school finance litigation intersected with the
"standards-based reform" movement of the 1980s. A series of reports, national
summits, and popular media charged that students in the United States were not
mastering basic core educational concepts and were falling behind their
international counterparts.1 7 1 In response, states developed core academic
standards that all students should meet.172 Plaintiffs began weaving those
academic standards and students' test scores into their legal claims. They
argued that state constitutional phrases uch as "efficient," "thorough," and
"sound basic" education obligated states to provide children with a level of
education that could be measured through the academic standards and tests that
166. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976).
167. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973).
168. See Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983); Horton v. Meskill,
376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 71 (Wash. 1978);
Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980).
169. Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 493, 516-17 (1995).
170. Erin E. Kelly, Note, All Students Are Not Created Equal: The Inequitable Combination of
Property-Tax-Based School Finance Systems and Local Control, 45 DuKE L.J. 397, 397-99 (1995);
Rebell, supra note 56, at 1866, 1888.
171. See Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S.
Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 550, 555-
61 (1992) (discussing the nature and scope of the national crisis in education); NAT'L COMM'N ON
EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 5 (1983)
(warning of a "rising tide of mediocrity" in American education).
172. Joetta L. Sack, The End of an Education Presidency, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 17, 2001, at 1
(discussing President Bush's national summit, which brought together the nation's governors and
resulted in a set of national and state education goals).
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states had developed.173 While a few courts ruled in plaintiffs' favor prior to
1989, that year, in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.,174 the Kentucky
Supreme Court became the first to fully articulate a qualitative right to
education.7 5 The court held that a constitutionally adequate or "efficient"
education included several specific skills and outcomes in each of the major
subjects of school curriculum.176 Following Rose, numerous other courts
borrowed from Rose's standards or followed Rose's approach in defining their
177own.
The third wave of litigation overcame some of the limitations of equity
litigation. By setting a standards-based qualitative floor, these cases prevented
the state from leveling down everyone's education to create basic equality. On
the other hand, adequacy standards left inequalities between rich and poor
districts untouched, so long as the state assured an adequate education
everywhere. But, for the same reason, standards-based litigation posed fewer
judicial and political objections,7 8 resulting in a much higher win rate for
plaintiffs. In twenty-seven cases between 1989 and 2006, plaintiffs prevailed
nearly 75 percent of the time, whereas plaintiffs were previously successful ess
than half the time. 179
173. Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, School Finance Litigation in the Name of
Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION
FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 34, 53-56 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999).
174. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
175. Id. at 212.
176. The court wrote that an efficient education requires:
(i) [S]ufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in ...
civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable
the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her . .. nation; (iv)
sufficient self-knowledge of... mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient ... arts
[education] to enable each student to appreciate [their] cultural and historic heritage; (vi)
sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational
fields . .. ; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable . . . students
to compete ... in the job market.
Id.
177. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 165-66 (Ala. 1993); Lake View Sch.
Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 485 (Ark. 2002), supplemented by 189 S.W.3d 1 (Ark.
2004); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 734 (Idaho 1993); McDuffy v.
Sec'y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor,
703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997); Abbeville Cty.
Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 527-28 (Tex. 1992).
178. See generally Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of
Courts in Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. CIv. RTS.
& CIV. LiBERTIES 83, 95-96 (2010).
179. Rebell, supra note 8, at 1527.
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B. The Goals of Constitutional Education Litigation
As a practical matter, constitutional education litigation has coalesced
around three major challenges and remedies. The first, of course, is money.1so
The primary challenge and desired remedy has been additional funding for
needy school districts, either by expanding the educational pot statewide or
redistributing existing resources.1st This focus has been so dominant that
constitutional education litigation is more popularly termed school finance
litigation.
The second goal is to improve educational opportunities. Additional
funding for needy districts is not an end in and of itself.182 Rather, additional
funding serves goals pertaining to the actual educational experiences and
instruction students receive.183 Those experiences depend on critical
educational inputs: teachers, technology, facilities, and support services, to
name a few. As a practical matter, improving these inputs often includes or
boils down to more money, but not necessarily. A state or district may need to
adopt policies to reallocate, more efficiently deliver, or prioritize these inputs
within the existing budget, as opposed to, for instance, devoting time and
resources to athletics or central administration.184 In fact, plaintiffs in Sheff v.
O'Neill successfully demonstrated that the organization of school districts and
segregation within them was the cause of educational inequality in the state.iss
In short, although money may be implicated, the precise legal challenge in
many cases is based on inadequate educational inputs and opportunity, not
money.
The third overarching goal in constitutional education litigation is to place
various important educational responsibilities on the state.186 Traditionally,
local districts have carried the primary financial and academic responsibility
for education. Through litigation, school districts and students have shifted
this responsibility to the state.1ss They have established that although the
practical responsibility for delivering education is delegated to districts, the
180. See generally Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Financing Adequate Educational Opportunity,
14 J.L. & POL. 483 (1998); Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts,
104 HARV. L. REv. 1072, 1074-75 (1991).
181. Unfulfilled Promises, supra note 180, at 1074-76.
182. Ryan, supra note 17, at 308.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 377-82 (N.J. 1990) (discussing the variance in
how efficiently districts use their funds); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 388-89
(N.C. 2004) (discussing strategic resource allocation).
185. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
186. Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 328 (1991).
187. Richard Briffault, The Role ofLocal Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CONN. L. REV.
773, 781 (1992); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
188. See Rebell, supra note 8, at 1527 (noting plaintiff victories against he state in over half of
the states).
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ultimate constitutional responsibility for education remains with the state.189
This requires not only that the state provide necessary financial and other
resources, but also that it establish standards and policies designed to ensure
the proper implementation of those resources. In other words, courts have
mandated that the state adopt academic standards to guide local districts in
carrying out their delegated duties and oversight standards by which the state
can hold local districts accountable.190
C. Separation ofPowers Limits on Education Remedies
The foregoing challenges and remedies always operate within the context
of separation of powers limitations. Courts in some states have refused to even
entertain plaintiffs' claims because they believe doing so would encroach on
the discretion in policy making that is reserved entirely to the legislature.191
Even when courts intervene, separation of powers concerns limit the scope of
their intervention.192 Courts may find a constitutional violation based on
inadequate funds or standards, but refrain from specifying the means by which
to remedy the violation.193 Where more than one reasonable solution to the
problem is possible, courts find it is the state's province, not the court's, to
exercise discretion in selecting a solution.194 As the Washington Supreme
Court wrote after finding a constitutional violation, "This court defers to the
legislature's chosen means of discharging its [education] duty" and will give
the legislature "the greatest possible latitude to participate in the full
implementation of the constitutional mandate."'1
95
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212-13 (Ky. 1989);
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006); see also Hancock v. Comm'r of
Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1157 (Mass. 2005) (noting that proposed remedies addressed only funding
and not the "failing administrative and financial management").
191. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 160-61 (Ga. 1981); Comm. for Educ.
Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996).
192. See generally Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of
Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REv. 701
(2010).
193. Id.; see also McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 232 (Wash. 2012) (refusing "to specify
standards for staffing ratios, salaries, and other program requirements").
194. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 861 N.E.2d at 59-60; Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v.
State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 397 (N.C. 2004).
195. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 231-32 (quoting Seattle School District No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71,
93 (Wash. 1978)); see also Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212 ("It is [the General Assembly's] decision how
best to achieve efficiency."); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 861 N.E.2d at 58 ("[I]n fashioning
specific remedies for constitutional violations, we must avoid intrusion on the primary domain of
another branch of government."); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 261 (N.C. 1997) ("[T]he
administration of the public schools of the state is best left to the legislative and executive branches of
government. [Courts] must grant every reasonable deference to the legislative and executive branches
when considering whether they have established and are administering a ... sound basic education.").
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Even the most aggressive courts have stopped short of dictating remedies
196at a level of detail that encroaches on legislative prerogative. When lower
courts have peremptorily mandated specific remedies, some higher courts have
been quick to strike them down, particularly when there was more than one
way to solve the problem.197 When states have implemented their own remedy,
courts have tended to apply a reasonableness tandard to the remedy rather than
substituting their judgment for that of the legislature.198 In short, while
constitutional litigation to enforce the right to education has clear goals,
separation of powers dictates leaving the exact manner in which those goals are
met to the state.
D. The Framework for Adjudicating Constitutional Education Claims
1. The Constitutional Duty and Right
The first step in any equity or adequacy litigation is to articulate the
state's constitutional duty. In an adequacy case, for instance, the Kentucky
Supreme Court found that the General Assembly had an "obligation ... to
provide for a system of common schools"199 and proceeded to describe the
necessary characteristics of that system. The system must be "efficient,"
provide equal opportunity, and be "substantially uniform" throughout the entire
state.200 The specific goal of an efficient education is to "develop[], as best the
state of education expertise allows, the minds, bodies and social morality of its
charges to prepare them for useful and happy occupations, recreation and
citizenship, and do[] so economically."20' Other courts speak of their states'
obligation to meet students' needs so that these students can achieve at the
196. See Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755, 763-64 (Kan. 2006); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212-14.
Only in the face of a clear violation that demands a particular remedy, which the state has refused to
implement after having been given the opportunity, will courts dictate specific remedies. Courts,
however, have been willing to agree that a particular remedy is appropriate once the state has proposed
it, or that a remedy proposed by the state is insufficient, based on evidence presented at trial. See, e.g.,
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 53, 59 (2006) (after ordering the State to ensure
the resources necessary for a sound basic education, holding that the State's remedy was not
"unreasonable").
197. See Hoke Cty. Bd. ofEduc., 599 S.E.2d at 393 (striking down a pre-kindergarten remedy
because "there is a marked difference between the State's [conceding] a need to assist 'at-risk'
students prior to enrollment in the public schools and a court order compelling the legislative and
executive branches to address that need in a singular fashion"); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767
S.E.2d 157 (S.C. 2014) (striking down trial court's specific remedy but upholding state liability).
198. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 861 N.E.2d at 59 (upholding State's plan
because it was not "unreasonable"); see also Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Ct. App. 1989)
(indicating disparities need only be reduced to insignificant levels and that many inequities are subject
to only rational basis review).
199. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 205.
200. Id. at 208.
201. Id.at210.
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requisite level or their states' obligation to deliver an adequate education,202 but
the general goal is the same-achieving some qualitative end. Equity cases
follow a similar approach. There, the duty is to deliver some substantially
203equitable result or opportunity, rather than a qualitative one.
After describing this general duty, courts often articulate structural
obligations that might be necessary for the state to deliver an equal or adequate
education. In Rose, for instance, the court indicated that the state's duty to
deliver an efficient education required the state to implement, control, and
204maintain the education system. Various courts have indicated that this entails
the state setting academic standards and goals that are connected to the
constitutionally required education and supervising the implementation of these
standards.205 The state might delegate implementation to school districts, but
because education is the state's obligation, the state must monitor local
206conditions to ensure its obligation is met. It cannot leave local districts to
sink or swim.
A structure for success, however, requires more than just state oversight
of districts. It also requires the state to ensure local districts have the capacity
to meet constitutional and statutory requirements. Courts speak of the state's
obligation to adequately or equitably fund education. They rarely state the
exact level of funds a district must have per pupil, but they routinely demand a
specific approach to school funding. This approach entails breaking down the
actual cost of delivering an equitable or adequate education into its constituent
components of student need, school district need based on student need, and
207local funding capacity. Creating a funding system that meets student and
district need is far from an exact science, but states have no excuse for funding
systems that produce happenstance results. As the Kansas Supreme Court
wrote, a state must develop a funding system that "is reasonably calculated to
have all . . . students meet or exceed the standards."208 In short, a state should
determine how much it costs to deliver the constitutionally required education,
account for variations based on student and district demographics, and create a
funding system that it reasonably expects will meet that need.
202. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995); Abbeville Cty.
Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 538-39 (S.C. 1999).
203. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn.
1996).
204. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 208.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 212-14; Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Pauley v. Kelly, 255
S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
207. See Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923, 937 (Kan. 2005) ("[A] determination of the reasonable
and actual costs of providing a constitutionally adequate education is critical."); McDuffy v. Sec'y of
Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861
N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006).
208. Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196 (Kan. 2014); see also McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227,
231 (Wash. 2012) (requiring a system that provides "dependable and regular tax sources").
115
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
Whether these constitutional duties also create individual rights is less
clear. A state could have a constitutional duty to fund or deliver education
without a student also having an individual right to, for instance, a quality
209teacher in math class or access to some particular curriculum. School finance
cases regularly refer to a constitutional or fundamental "right to education"
without necessarily enforcing it as an individual right.210 A few courts have
specifically rejected the notion of an individually enforceable constitutional
21 1 212right to education, and a few have specifically accepted the idea. But most
courts simply obfuscate the distinction, speaking of rights while engaging in a
mode of analysis and enforcement based nearly exclusively on a constitutional
213duty by the state. Scholars are divided over how best to interpret this
precedent.2 14
209. The most poignant example of the distinction between rights and duties may be in torts,
which has developed the concept of public duties. Courts hold that local governments have a duty to
the public to deliver certain municipal services, such as fire and police protection, but those duties are
not individually enforced. Thus, although local government has a duty to deliver services to the public
at large, individuals cannot bring claims when the police department fails to send out an officer in
response to a request, at least not until an individual officer forms a special relationship with an
individual citizen or puts that citizen in a worse position than he or she otherwise would have been in.
See, e.g., Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 543 N.E.2d 443 (N.Y. 1989); Riss v. City of New York, 240
N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968).
210. See, e.g., Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 235 (Conn.
2010) (holding that education is a fundamental right); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 201; Leandro v. State, 488
S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997).
211. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993) ("The right to an
adequate education mandated by the constitution is not based on the exclusive needs of a particular
individual, but rather is a right held by the public to enforce the State's duty."); see also Lake View
Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 493-94 (Ark. 2002), supplemented by 189 S.W.3d 1
(Ark. 2004) (quoting the New Hampshire Supreme Court's statement on individual rights versus
public duties).
212. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 86-87 (Wash. 1978) (concluding that its
state constitution's education clauses were "guarantees of a personal nature" and reflect a "right").
213. See Bauries, supra note 192, at 982-89 (discussing cases and pointing out, for instance,
that in the seminal adequacy case in Kentucky, the supreme court announced a "right" but then
proceeded to define it in terms of state duties).
214. Scott Bauries reasons that "both the evidence presented and the remedies the courts order
focus on the state education system as a whole, rather than on any individual student rights-holders.
Thus, other than as a means of surmounting threshold obstacles to relief, an individual right to
education under state constitutions is more rhetoric than reality." Id. at 952-53. Others reason that the
precedent does create individual rights. Derek Black, The Constitutional Fix for SC Schools, STATE,
Nov. 18, 2012 (reasoning that students had individually enforceable constitutional rights to education
that the court should recognize); Weishart, supra note 161. While Bauries argues these decisions do
not create individual rights, he argues new litigation should be designed to establish such rights.
Bauries, supra note 192, at 954.
This question of whether a right exists is more directly implicated in cases in which individual
students seek to use the constitutional "right to education" to challenge their expulsion from school or
the lack of alternative education opportunities. The case law there is relatively undeveloped and
unfavorable to students, but courts do appear to assume an individual right, even if they reason that
plaintiffs have forfeited it or are not entitled to the relief they seek. See Emily Bloomenthal,
Inadequate Discipline: Challenging Zero Tolerance Policies as Violating State Constitution Education
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Conclusively resolving that debate is beyond the scope of this Article. It
suffices to say that the fairest reading of school finance and other relevant
precedent may simply be that the scope of any individual right to education is
not clearly defined while state duties are. This means plaintiffs have strong
legitimate bases upon which to pursue individual claims, but no definite basis
on which to expect a court to respond positively. This point could prove
particularly relevant in constitutional challenges to tenure, as they are, in effect,
premised on the idea that individual students' have the right to demand that
individual teachers be removed. Understood this way, a court could more
directly be called on to recognize individual rights as opposed to just a
constitutional duty.
2. A Substantial and Systematic Deprivation ofEducation Rights
To establish a violation of educational rights or duties, courts have
required several distinct types of evidentiary showings by plaintiffs. A bare
allegation that some policy, funding mechanism, or resource shortage produces
inequality or inadequacy is insufficient. Courts generally presume the
constitutionality of a state's educational program and, thus, the burden is on the
plaintiff to prove otherwise.2 15 First, a plaintiff must show a substantial
216deprivation of the constitutional right to education. As the Connecticut
Supreme Court emphasized, "plaintiffs must make a prima facie showing that
the disparities . . . are more than de minimis in that the disparities continue to
jeopardize the plaintiffs' fundamental right to education."2 17 If the disparities
are only incidental to some legitimate state goal or insubstantial, a court will
not invalidate them.218 Likewise, when courts speak of demonstrating
inadequate or inequitable educational opportunities, they mean more than just
some identifiable deficiency; they mean deficiencies that affect students'
ability to obtain an overall adequate education.
Embedded in the concept of a substantial violation is also the existence of
a systematic deprivation. Courts frame their analysis in terms of school systems
and trends across them.219 No court has ever recognized a claim against the
Clauses, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 303, 329-35 (2011) (reviewing cases challenging school
discipline based on a state constitutional right to education).
215. See Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 261 ("Only such a clear showing [that students have not
received an adequate education] will justify a judicial intrusion into an area so clearly the province,
initially at least, of the legislative and executive branches."); see also Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 209.
216. See Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 606 (Ct. App. 1989) (indicating "an insubstantial
burden" is insufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 197 (examining inequities
throughout 177 local school districts); McDuffy v. Sec'y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516,
520-22 (Mass. 1993) (examining violations spanning across twelve districts).
217. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
218. Id.; Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 2004) (articulating a burden
shifting test whereby the state might justify disparities).
219. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006) (finding
that test results and graduation rates reflected systemic failure, and the State's actions were a
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state based on isolated inadequacies or inequalities. Plaintiff victories are
always supported by evidence of violations stretching across multiple schools
and districts. In effect, random-as opposed to systematic-deficiencies are
220almost necessarily substantial (although there are surely exceptions). None
of the foregoing, however, is to suggest there are no circumstances under which
a court could entertain remedies for individual students, but only that for a
claim against the state to arise, the individual injury would need to arise from
systemic and substantial violations .221
3. Input Causation: Proving State Policy Is the Cause of Local
Deprivations
Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the substantial education deprivation in
question falls within the purview of state control or responsibility. This requires
plaintiffs to establish two different and distinct types of causation. Plaintiffs
must establish that a state statute or policy is the cause of some precise
financial, resource, or other tangible deficiency in local school districts (which
this Section discusses). Next, the plaintiffs must establish that the deficiency,
not some other factor, causes harm to students (which the next Subsection
discusses). The North Carolina Supreme Court emphasized in plain language:
"[I]t is one thing for plaintiffs to demonstrate that a large number of Hoke
County students are failing to obtain a sound, basic public education. It is quite
another for plaintiffs to show that such a failure is primarily the result of action
and/or inaction of the State."222
substantial cause of the constitutional violation); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ., 599 S.E.2d at 386-89
(finding that state act had caused systematic poor performance); Pauley v. Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128, 132
(W. Va. 1984) (discussing lower court's finding that "all county systems required improvement"); see
also DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1195-98 (Ohio 2001), opinion vacated on other grounds on
reconsideration, 780 N.E.2d 529 (2002) ("[E]fficiency and thoroughness in Ohio's system of common
schools is a statewide goal rather than a local one.").
220. Districts, or the state through vicarious responsibility, can be sued on narrower grounds,
but the nature of such a claim is distinct from those discussed in this Article. Black, supra note 17, at
390-95 (concluding that local school districts have a constitutional responsibility to carry out the
duties delegated to them by the state).
221. For instance, when a state refuses to remedy systemic violations, individual students
theoretically should be ntitled to transfer out of their inadequate schools to other public schools that
are delivering a constitutional education. Black, supra note 214. Ordering this type of injunction
remedy, moreover, would place pressure on the state to carry out its responsibility writ large. Courts
have yet to take this step, although it does not appear that litigants have asked them to do so.
Scott Bauries devotes substantial analysis to the predicates of systemic violations in school
finance precedent, citing them as a serious flaw in the precedent that impedes the vindication of
individual rights: "This systemic focus leads to a systemic, rather than an individual, approach to
remediation, which ultimately subverts any individual interests or rights that might have given rise to
the claims in the first place." Bauries, supra note 31, at 953. Weishart, however, postulates that the
requirement of a systematic violation may be attributable to concerns other than warding off individual
claims. Weishart, supra note 161. It may be, as the preceding paragraph suggests, in the absence of
systemic action, the injury is not attributable to the state, but once systematic action is established,
individual injuries are redressable.
222. Hoke Cty. Bd. ofEduc., 599 S.E.2d at 631.
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In the earliest years of school finance litigation, some courts were willing
223
to infer causal connections based on general social science or common sense.
Subsequent courts increasingly parsed out distinct causal inquiries and required
224
specific supporting statistical evidence. This step in a plaintiffs claim is far
more challenging than establishing the existence of a substantial educational
deprivation. The state might very well concede the existence of educational
inequities or deprivations, but causation invites bitter contests on various points
ranging from whether money matters to whether test scores accurately measure
225educational quality.
The state, if not the court, will inevitably raise the possibility that state
226action is not the cause of local educational deficiencies. If plaintiffs allege
schools do not have enough money to maintain their facilities, for instance, the
state will question whether its action or inaction is the cause of the money
shortfall. This causal inquiry frequently leads to lengthy judicial discussions of
how school financing works and whether the financing system places too much
227burden on localities. It may be that some similarly situated districts can
maintain adequate facilities, while others cannot. If this is the case, local action
or random variables may be the cause of deprivations rather than the state.
The same causal analysis has ensued from claims of inadequate teaching
in school districts. That inadequate teaching is occurring in a school does not
mean the state is the cause of it. Poor leadership at the local level, poor
professional development, overcrowded classrooms, or insufficient funds to
hire or retain quality teachers could all be causal factors.228 Even within each of
these factors, the cause might be state or local policy. The state, of course,
might be responsible for rectifying problematic local policies, but this would,
229
nonetheless, raise a distinct causal factor and challenge to the state.
223. See Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944, 947 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated sub nom. Askew v.
Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976). But see San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973) (questioning whether "there is a
demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures and the quality of education").
224. See Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to Be Learned, 64 FLA. L.
REV. 1723, 1743-46 (2012).
225. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (recognizing dispute over whether and how
money matters); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ., 599 S.E.2d at 381-84 (responding to challenges to lower
court's reliance on test scores).
226. See Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 615-16 (Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting the presmise
that the State caused "no more than 10 to 30 percent" of disparities); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc.
v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 343 (N.Y. 2003) (arguing that "inefficient management of personnel is the
supervening cause ... rather than the funding system").
227. See, e.g., Serrano, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 593-600; Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn.
1977); Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923, 932-37 (Kan. 2005) (detailing nine different aspects of school
funding in the state).
228. The State in both New York and New Jersey raised these exact same issues as causal
defenses, although the courts in both instances rejected the State's theory. Abbott ex rel. Abbott v.
Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1040 (N.J. 2011); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 801 N.E.2d at 343-44.
229. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 801 N.E.2d at 344 (writing that "the simple
constitutional principle that the State has ultimate responsibility for the schools[] counsel[s] us against
119
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
Regardless, the point is that plaintiffs must pinpoint state policy that has causal
230effects at the local level. It is not enough to simply allege an education
deficiency.
4. Output Causation: Proving the Deprivation Affects Educational
Outcomes
In addition to establishing a causal connection between state policy and
local deficiencies, plaintiffs must establish a causal connection between the
deficiency-for instance, teacher qualifications-and educational outcomes.
New York's highest court provides one of the most poignant delineations of
this two-step causation analysis. It analyzed various alleged inadequacies in
inputs-teachers, class size, facilities, computers, libraries, and textbooks-and
whether each one was causally connected to the deprivation of the
231constitutionally required education. Plaintiffs' burden was to establish "the
necessary 'causal link' between the present funding system and the poor
performance of City schools."232 This meant proving that: (1) increased
funding leads to "better teachers, facilities and instrumentalities of learning"
and (2) better teachers, facilities, and instrumentalities "yield better student
performance."233 Speaking of the second link in this causal chain, the court
wrote: "[O]n this record it cannot be said that plaintiffs have proved a
measurable correlation between building disrepair and student performance."23 4
The court neatly summarized both causal steps in its discussion of teachers,
finding that the evidence demonstrated "that better funded schools would hire
the State's rebuttal arguments on causation" that suggest local personnel management failures were the
cause of educational inadequacies).
230. The West Virginia Supreme Court offers a glimpse of the complexities involved in
pinpointing causation. It suggested no less than five causal factors and multiple different parties as
explaining the educational deficiencies in the state:
[W]hether the lack of a high quality educational system is the result of a failure to follow
existing statutes and standards or whether it is due to an inadequacy of the existing system;
whether the financing of the existing educational system is equitable on the state and local
levels, including investigation into the efficacy of state supplemental aid to county school
systems and distribution of the State School Building Fund, and the disparity in property
values and property assessment among the counties; whether various State agencies and
officials are performing their constitutional and statutory duties with respect to education,
including the State Board of School Finance, West Virginia Board of Education, State
Superintendent of Schools and State Tax Commissioner; and whether local school officials
are properly performing their statutory duties.
Pauley v. Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128, 130 (W. Va. 1984).
231. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 801 N.E.2d at 340-41.
232. Id.; see also id. at 335 ("[P]laintiffs had to show that insufficient finding led to inadequate
inputs which led to unsatisfactory results.").
233. Id. at 340.
234. Id. at 334-35. The court also indicated causal problems in regard to classroom supplies. Id.
at 335-36.
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and retain more certified teachers, and that students with such teachers would
score better."235
Other courts are less explicit in breaking causation into two steps, but the
overarching question of whether money matters necessarily involves two steps,
and has dominated school funding litigation for four decades. In Serrano v.
Priest-one of the first school funding cases filed the California Supreme
Court analyzed whether "[t]here is a distinct relationship between cost and the
quality of educational opportunities afforded," or more precisely, whether
"differences in dollars do produce differences in pupil achievement."236
Likewise, in the seminal adequacy case Rose v. Council-the Kentucky
Supreme Court required "a definite correlation between the money spent per
child on education and the quality of the education received."237 Each of these
cases, along with various others, involved plaintiffs demonstrating that (1) state
policy was the cause of resource deprivation at the local level, and (2) the
resource deprivation played a causal role in student outcomes and achievement.
The second causal step is more complex than the first, and has been the
source of significant study and debate for decades.238 To reliably address it,
plaintiffs' evidence should account for any number of variables, including, at
the very least, locality costs, locality capacity, and student demographics
(poverty, language status, race, and disability).239 The state, on the other hand,
regularly argues that student characteristics are beyond its control, and that
240they-not state policy-are the primary causal factor in student outcomes.
The outcome in most cases ultimately rests on this second causal question.
Plaintiffs' inability to adequately answer it initially hampered school finance
litigation, while later social science developments helped shift the overall
241trajectory of the litigation.
235. Id. at 340-41. "[I]n districts where teachers perform badly on teacher certification tests,
student performance declines as student grade level rises and, conversely, that where teachers test
well, student performance at higher grade levels surpasses student performance at lower grade levels."
Id. at 334.
236. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976).
237. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 198 (Ky. 1989).
238. See generally Jennifer King Rice & Amy Ellen Schwartz, Toward an Understanding of
Productivity in Education, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY 125
(Helen F. Ladd & Margaret E. Goertz eds., 2d ed. 2015) (discussing production function studies that
find correlation between specific levels of resource inputs and student outcomes); Clive R. Belfield,
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH, supra, at 141.
239. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 378, 380, 382 (N.J. 1990); Campaign for Fiscal
Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006).
240. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1287 (Conn. 1996) (stating that "defendants stress ... the
significant role that adverse socioeconomic conditions play"); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 801
N.E.2d at 341 (examining State's argument that "children come to the New York City schools
ineducable, unfit to learn"); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 384 (N.C. 2004)
(arguing that "students ... failing to obtain a sound basic education ... is due to factors other than the
educational offerings provided by the State").
241. Compare San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973), with
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 197; see also Black, supra note 224, at 1747-79 (discussing the evolution of
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5. Establishing That the State Can Remedy the Problem
In addition to establishing that the state has caused a substantial and
systematic harm that affects educational outcomes, some courts may also
require plaintiffs to show that the constitutional violation is susceptible to a
solution that is within the state's control and power. Plaintiffs might make this
showing in conjunction with two-step causation. For instance, demonstrating
that money affects educational outcomes would implicitly demonstrate the
availability of a remedy: more money. For some courts, this is enough because
money can be the catchall remedy to a myriad of problems.242 As the California
Supreme Court explained, money dictates whether districts have the capacity to
243respond to the particular challenges in their communities. Thus, it is the
244
state's duty to ensure access to the necessary resources.
Demonstrating non-monetary remedies, however, may require additional
evidence, which might be developed as part of plaintiffs' initial case or after a
finding of state liability. For instance, Sheff v. O'Neill involved a challenge to
245inter-district segregation. While plaintiffs' initial case demonstrated a
constitutional violation by the state, subsequent proceedings were necessary for
246plaintiffs to demonstrate that a particular remedy was in order. Even if
plaintiffs demonstrate the efficacy of a remedy-money or otherwise-it is
important to reiterate that working out the details of that remedy will remain
247with the state. Such an approach is consistent with general separation of
approaches to the causal role of money). The issue, however, continues as a point of scholarly and
legal debate. See Home v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 474-75 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Eric
A. Hanushek, The Failure of Input-Based Schooling Policies, 113 EcON. J. F64, F69-F70 (2003)
(reviewing U.S. data regarding funding and school performance); Rebell, supra note 8.
242. See, e.g., Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 390 (Vt. 1997) ("Money is clearly not the only
variable affecting educational opportunity, but it is one that government can effectively equalize.").
243. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 947 (Cal. 1976) (reasoning that different schools have
different challenges and, thus, spend their money differently, but "the ability of a school district to
meet those problems peculiar to it depends in large part upon the taxable wealth of that district").
244. Id. at 957.
245. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
246. See id. at 1290-91.
247. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 214 (Ky. 1989) ("It is
now up to the General Assembly to re-create, and re-establish a system . .. which will be in
compliance with the Constitution."). Courts do, however, intervene after state recalcitrance or
negligence. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 458-61 (N.J. 1998), opinion clarified sub nom.
Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 164 N.J. 84, 751 A.2d 1032 (2000); Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State,
907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995); see also Bauries, supra note 192, at 746-54 (analyzing the separation of
powers problems that arise when a court orders a remedy in school finance litigation); William A.
Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE
L.J. 635, 694 (1982) ("The only legitimate basis for a [] judge to take over the political function in
devising or choosing a remedy in an institutional suit is the demonstrated unwillingness or incapacity
of the political body.").
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powers limits on the judiciary and the specific language of numerous state
constitutions .248
E. Theorizing Teacher Tenure as an Impediment to Delivering a
Constitutional Education
The scope of rights and duties declared in equity and adequacy decisions
is sufficiently broad to theoretically capture almost any education policy
imaginable. School finance challenges have been the dominant means of
employing the rights and duties, but plaintiffs have used the constitutional right
to and duty of education in other contexts, including challenges to school
districting, intra-district student assignment, student expulsions, and school
249consolidation. Plaintiffs have also used the precedent to affirmatively
250demand alternative schools and pre-kindergarten education. In fact, for the
past two decades, scholars have called for a fourth wave of litigation that
moves entirely beyond money to challenge the racial and socioeconomic
isolation in schools. While that fourth wave has not materialized, the
constitutional challenges to teacher tenure draw on a similar interpretation of
and approach to the precedent.
The first constitutional challenge to tenure, Vergara, was filed in
California in 2012.251 After a trial and a favorable ruling in 2014, a second
case, Davids v. State, identical in almost all important respects to Vergara, was
252filed in New York. The highest courts in California and New York will soon
decide the fate of teacher tenure, and the effects of those decisions will ripple
across numerous other states, including the other states where litigation is
253
already promised. Just as Serrano and Rose played an enormous role in
248. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1 ("[I]t shall be the duty of the general assembly ... to
adopt all means which it may deem necessary and proper to secure to the people the advantages and
opportunities of education.").
249. See, e.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996); Pendleton Citizens for Comty.
Sch. v. Marockie, 507 S.E.2d 673 (W. Va. 1998); Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of Educ.,
484 S.E.2d 909, 911 (W. Va. 1996); Second Amended Complaint by Plaintiff-Intervenors CMS
Students & Charlotte-Mecklenburg NAACP at 3-5, Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., No. 95 CVS 1158 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2005).
250. See, e.g., King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 260-
61 (N.C. 2010); James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 49 (2006).
251. Vergara Complaint, supra note 11.
252. Verified Amended Complaint at 4, Davids v. State, No. 101105/14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 30,
2014) [hereinafter Davids Complaint].
253. See generally Edwards, supra note 6 (noting potential additional litigation beyond
California and New York in Connecticut, Oregon, and New Jersey); Kim McGuire, California
Teacher Tenure Ruling Is Likely to Be Felt in Minnesota, STAR TRIBUNE (June 12, 2014, 9:49 PM),
http://www.startribune.com/california-teacher-tenure-ruling-is-likely-to-be-felt-in-minnesota/2629717
01 [http://perma.cc/82Z4-FLSZ] (discussing potential litigation in Minnesota). See also Motoko Rich,
Celebrated Trial Lawyer to Head Group Challenging Teacher Tenure, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2014),
http://nyti.ms/lIrOfMW [http://perma.cc/FLK5-FY4P] (discussing the litigation's connection to
StudentsFirst, a national organization); Where We Work, STUDENTSFIRST, https://www.students
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shaping the reasoning of other state court decisions that followed, so too will
these first two teacher tenure cases shape future tenure fights in other states. In
addition, the way in which courts decide to expand or retract the nature of the
constitutional right to education will have significant ramifications on the
viability of other claims beyond school finance. In short, the stakes of the
outcomes in California and New York could not be any higher.
In California, plaintiffs' tenure claims rest on four primary factual
allegations: (1) it is easy to get tenure; (2) easy tenure perpetuates the retention
of ineffective teachers; (3) tenure and reduction-in-force rules make it
impossible or too costly for districts to terminate ineffective teachers; and (4)
these ineffective teachers cause unequal, and therefore unconstitutional,
25educational opportunities.25 Plaintiffs also add that statutory seniority rights
make things worse during reductions-in-force because "last-in-first-out"
policies require districts to retain senior teachers, even if they are grossly
255ineffective, and dismiss junior teachers, even if they are highly effective. The
trial court agreed and declared all of California's challenged tenure and
seniority statutes unconstitutional.25 6
In New York, plaintiffs make the same core factual allegations, but add a
few local details. They claim that out of 75,000 teachers in New York City,
"only 12 teachers were dismissed 'for incompetent teaching' over the entire
decade from 1997 to 2007."257 They further claim the low dismissal rate is a
result of "'super' due process" that drives "the average cost of dismissing a
teacher for ineffectiveness in New York [to] $313,000, and takes an average of
830 days."258 They also emphasize that New York's highest court previously
identified teachers as a crucial part of delivering an adequate education, and the
plaintiffs reasoned that due process protections for teachers are the cause of
inadequate education i  many schools.259 The courts in New York have yet to
reach the merits of these claims, but the trial court held that plaintiffs' claims
-- 260were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
first.org [https://perma.cc/7UCR-QBH8] (scroll over "Where We Work" tab; then follow individual
state hyperlinks) (indicating the organization is working in ten states).
254. Vergara Complaint, supra note 11.
255. Id. at 3.
256. Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014).
257. Davids Complaint, supra note 252, at 4. A second suit, Wright v. State, was also filed in
New York, but quickly consolidated with Davids. See Davids v. State, No. 10115/14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 12, 2014), http://1awprofessors.typepad.com/files/2015-march-motion-to-dismiss-denied--a-043--
-davids-wright.pdf [http://perma.cc/V9VT-P7AC] (order denying motions to dismiss).
258. Davids Complaint, supra note 252, at 11 (citing N.Y. STATE SCH. BDS. Ass'N,
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ALL (2007)).
259. Id.at2,11.
260. Davids, No. 10115/14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 12, 2014).
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1. A Facially Valid Theory
The first question courts must answer is whether challenges to teacher
tenure and seniority fit within existing precedent-a question, given its novelty,
that can only be conclusively answered by the highest courts in the states.
Theoretically, the foregoing tenure, retention, and seniority claims would fit
easily within the education rights and duties articulated by various state courts.
The theory and rights of those prior cases are not limited to school funding or
261academic standards. Moreover, a substantial number of cases already
emphasize the importance of teachers in providing adequate or equitable
262educational opportunities. Thus, at the highest level of abstraction, teacher
tenure, retention, and seniority claims fall within equity and adequacy
precedent.
Tenure challenges also roughly allege the necessary aspects of the five-
pronged framework for establishing a constitutional violation described in Part
III.D. First, the plaintiffs in tenure cases cite to the constitutional duty in their
state. Second, they allege a constitutional deficiency: certain schools are
263straddled with substantial numbers of low-quality teachers. Third, they
allege state statutes cause the deficiencies: schools cannot efficiently remove
ineffective teachers because of state policies on teacher tenure, retention, and
264seniority. Fourth, they allege the second step of causation: ineffective
teachers cause inadequate or inequitable educational outcomes. They base this
causal assertion on research findings that the "key determinant" of educational
outcomes "is teacher quality."265 Finally, they assert a remedy is possible based
on social science: removing these teachers and replacing them with just
average teachers would produce enormous positive short- and long-term
261. See, e.g., Black, supra note 17; Ryan, supra note 17.
262. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 498 (Ark. 2002),
supplemented by 189 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2004) ("Well-paid and well-motivated teachers are what make
the education engine run."); Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 458-59 (N.J. 1998), opinion clarified sub
nom. Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 751 A.2d 1032 (N.J. 2000) (discussing the role of teachers and
smaller classes in whole-school reform); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 53
(N.Y. 2006) (indicating that an adequate education includes access to quality teachers); Campaign for
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 336 (N.Y. 2003) ("[T]ens of thousands of students are
placed in overcrowded classrooms, taught by unqualified teachers, and provided with inadequate
facilities and equipment. The number of children in these straits is large enough to represent a systemic
failure."); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 386-87 (N.C. 2004) (reviewing the trial
court's finding that inadequate access to teachers deprived students of an adequate education);
DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 745 (Ohio 1997) (directing the state to ensure an "appropriate
student-teacher ratio"); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 91 S.W.3d 232 (Tenn. 2002) (mandating
that the state's budget be based on the actual cost of teacher salaries so as to ensure access to equal
educational opportunities).
263. See Vergara Complaint, supra note 11, at 18-20 (arguing that students of color and
language minorities have disproportionate numbers of ineffective teachers and can lose 30 percent of
their teaching staff, which will be replaced by senior teachers from other schools in the "dance of the
lemons"); Davids Complaint, supra note 252, at 3.
264. Vergara Complaint, supra note 11, at 3; Davids Complaint, supra note 252, at 3.
265. Vergara Complaint, supra note 11, at 3; Davids Complaint, supra note 252, at 2.
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benefits in education and employment.26 6 Thus, they say, tenure, retention, and
seniority policies violate students' constitutional right to an equal or adequate
267education.
Notwithstanding the foregoing similarities, three major conceptual
distinctions between prior precedent and the tenure and seniority challenges
can be identified. First, prior cases sought to expand the teaching pool and/or
the resources available to recruit, compensate, and retain teachers.268 But tenure
lawsuits seek to remove teachers and, thereby, shrink or hold constant teaching
ranks. Noticeably absent from the tenure challenges is any serious discussion of
the labor market or disparities in teacher salaries, which prior suits identified as
a problem.269
Second, in prior cases, teachers were only one piece of a much larger
270puzzle of inadequate or inequitable education. In the tenure and seniority
suits, teachers are removed from the much larger puzzle of educational
opportunity and examined in isolation. In fact, the Vergara plaintiffs argue they
need not identify the primary or overall causes of the constitutional violation.27'
They need only demonstrate that tenure and seniority are factors in causing a
272violation. They justify their isolated analysis of tenure and seniority based on
the premise that teachers matter most.273 Regardless, the tenure and seniority
claims present only part of the story of inequitable and inadequate education,
whereas prior cases examined the entire education system.
Third, the theory of prior cases was not that the state's teacher policies
were themselves flawed, but that the state's financial policies indirectly
274undermined the teaching profession. Again, teachers were part of a larger
puzzle. The tenure lawsuits, in contrast, focus on specific teacher tenure,
removal, and seniority policy as the flaw in state policy, not the overall
structure in which tenure and seniority operate.
266. Vergara Complaint, supra note 11, at 10; Davids Complaint, supra note 252, at 8-9.
267. Vergara Complaint, supra note 11, at 4-5; Davids Complaint, supra note 252, at 3.
268. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 53 (N.Y. 2006) (discussing the
need to "attract and retain qualified teachers"); see also DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 744 (Ohio
1997) (finding schools were so starved for funds that they could not comply with the required student-
teacher ratios); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 91 S.W.3d 232, 233 (Tenn. 2002) (discussing the
equalization of teacher salaries).
269. See, e.g., Welner, supra note 31, at 128.
270. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 500 (Ark. 2002),
supplemented by 189 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2004) (finding "discrepancies in curriculum, facilities,
equipment, and teacher pay"); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 861 N.E.2d at 52-53 (examining
multiple aspects of education in assessing overall adequacy).
271. Vergara Complaint, supra note 11, at 6-7.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 3; Davids Complaint, supra note 252, at 2-3.
274. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 861 N.E.2d at 53; Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v.
State, No. 95 CVS 1158, 2000 WL 1639686 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000), aff'd in part as modified,
rev'd in part, 599 S.E.2d 365 (2004).
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These distinctions, while meaningful, are not necessarily fatal at a prima
facie level to plaintiffs' claims. Precedent does not require a wholesale attack
on a state's education system, and all educational deficiencies certainly are not
equal. Most would agree that quality teachers are a centerpiece of a
275constitutional education. Thus, narrowing one's claim to teachers is logical.
For instance, if a state statute is the lynchpin of depriving students of access to
quality teachers, that statute might very well warrant singular focus. Moreover,
school finance equity suits have a singular focus of their own-how state
finance statutes deprive students of an equal or adequate education. Finance
questions just involve a more complex set of statutes.
One might counter that prior cases do not presuppose a singular solution
to the problem or the per se unconstitutionality of state statutes.276 Prior cases
identify state statutes as causing inadequate funding, but the fundamental
problem is not necessarily the reliance on local funds that some state statutes
embody. A state could theoretically retain local funding so long as it
sufficiently offset the inadequacies it caused or supplemented local funding in
some locations. The tenure, retention, and seniority claims, in contrast, present
a per se challenge to state policies that clearly envision another approach the
state must take.277
However, that plaintiffs may overstate their claim or presuppose a specific
remedy to which they may not be entitled does not outweigh or eliminate the
otherwise strong similarities between tenure challenges and prior cases. To
reject plaintiffs' claims outright, a court would have to draw artificial
distinctions between the cases that would likely do harm not only to tenure
claims in the future but also to the other important uses to which education
rights might be put. To the extent plaintiffs' claims are flawed, they are flawed
on a deeper level that requires a consideration of the facts. Thus, the ability to
raise a challenge to teacher tenure under precedent should be easily answered
in the affirmative.
2. Flaws and Assumptions in the Constitutional Challenge to Teacher
Tenure
Alleging and proving a constitutional violation are, of course, entirely
distinct. Plaintiffs' claims, and the trial court's adjudication, proceed with a set
of assumptions that are neither currently established in facts nor easily
275. See HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON TEACHER EDUCATION: ENDURING QUESTIONS IN
CHANGING CONTEXTS 527 (Marilyn Cochran-Smith et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008) (discussing the consensus
regarding the importance of quality teachers).
276. Scott Bauries argues that the polycentric nature of reforming education policy is what
makes institutional reform litigation so fraught with peril. Bauries, supra note 192, at 960-61, 977
("[T]he nature of an education clause claim gives rise to all of the dangers that Fuller warned us of
when courts attempt to solve polycentric problems through judicial orders. . ..").




susceptible to proof in the future.278 The first and most problematic set of
assumptions relates to the heart of any constitutional education claim:
causation. While most agree that ineffective teaching is a serious problem, the
279cause of and solution to ineffective teaching is far from clear. Plaintiffs,
nonetheless, jump to the conclusion that, of all the interrelated aspects and
potential causes of ineffective teaching, tenure is the main cause, if not the only
one.
Second, plaintiffs assume the number of ineffective teachers the current
system produces rises to the level of a substantial and systematic educational
deprivation. This may be possible, but it is unlikely. By narrowing their claim
solely to teacher tenure and retention policies, and excluding the broader
educational system and teacher policies, plaintiffs place enormous weight on
one aspect of education policy. Neither the general inadequacies in a school
system, nor the general ineffectiveness of teachers in that system, can be
marshaled in support of their claim of a deprivation. They must establish that
the ineffective tenured teachers, who otherwise would have been dismissed,
create a substantial and systematic violation. In effect, plaintiffs' tenure theory
gives rise to a more difficult practical evidentiary burden than the one carried
by prior adequacy and equity litigants.
Finally, plaintiffs' claims assume the existence of some reliable
evaluation and retention system that could replace current policies and produce
a better result. As demonstrated in Part II, better and more reliable policies are
not yet available. Plaintiffs overlook the possibility that ineffective teaching is
a result of ineffective evaluation and support systems, not the existence of
tenure.280 Removing tenure would not resolve administrators' evaluation
challenges or cure the flaws of student growth percentile models and value-
added models. Moreover, due process protections could prohibit states from
eliminating tenure and simply replacing it with unreliable evaluation methods.
The following Sections address each of the foregoing sets of assumptions
regarding tenure. The claims about seniority or the last-in-first-out statute are
addressed separately in Section E.3.
a. Tenure Has Not Been Established as a Cause of Ineffective Teaching
While voluminous, social science research on teacher quality has
produced only generalized findings regarding teachers' effect on student
outcomes. It does not resolve the far more complicated question of how to
278. The trial court's basic finding "by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Challenged
Statutes impose a real and appreciable impact on students' fundamental right to equality of education"
is an entirely unsatisfying response to several distinct and complicated questions. Vergara v. State, No.
BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014).
279. See Welner, supra note 31, at 130-34 (discussing the various complex factors that play a
role in ineffective teaching).
280. See id. at 135 (discussing the role that poorly designed evaluation systems can play in
undermining teacher effectiveness).
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identify those specific teachers who are ineffective, nor whether teachers
lacking in effectiveness can or should be helped or fired.21 The research
certainly does not speak to whether tenure has a positive or negative effect on
individual teachers and the overall quality of the teaching profession, nor does
the research answer these specific questions for California or New York.
Plaintiffs' claims rest principally on the study by Raj Chetty et al. and his
subsequent testimony that nalyze whether "teachers' impacts on students' test
scores ("value-added") [are] a good measure of their quality" and "whether
high-VA [value-added] teachers improve students' long-term outcomes."282
Chetty concludes the answer to both questions is yes, and he offers the awe-
inducing conclusion that "[r]eplacing a teacher whose VA is in the bottom 5%
with an average teacher would increase the present value of students' lifetime
income by more than $250,000 for the average class-room."28 3 The study's
assumptions, methodology, and data have all been subject to extensive critiques
284that call some of its findings into question. But even assuming the study's
validity, the study on its face does not answer many questions central to
plaintiffs' claim. The study even concedes points that are inconsistent with or
insufficient to substantiate the challenge to tenure.
First and foremost, the study does not even include the word "tenure,"
much less analyze its impact. Thus, it cannot establish a general causal
connection between tenure and teacher quality or effectiveness. The study
examines one large urban school district in some state other than California.285
It does not examine California or any particular school district in it, which
281. See generally Baker et al., supra note 30. Even the earliest proponent of value-added
assessments recognized the limitations of identifying effective teachers. William L. Sanders & Sandra
P. Horn, Educational Assessment Reassessed: The Usefulness of Standardized and Alternative
Measures of Student Achievement as Indicators for the Assessment ofEducational Outcomes, EDUC.
POL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, Mar. 3, 1995 (cautioning against relying on any single factor to evaluate
teachers).
282. See Chetty et al., supra note 26.
283. Id.
284. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 109, at 9 (identifying seven different methodological and
assumption flaws in Chetty's study); Audrey Amrein-Beardsley, Unpacking DC's Impact, or the Lack
Thereof VAMBOOZLED! BLOG (Nov. 25, 2013), http://vamboozled.com/unpacking-dcs-impact-or-the-
lack-thereof-consumer-alert [http://perma.cc/X7KB-78FV]; Bruce D. Baker, Fire First, Ask Questions
Later? Comments on Recent Teacher Effectiveness Studies, SCH. FIN. 101 BLOG (Jan. 7, 2012),
https://schoolfinancel01.wordpress.com/2012/01/07/fire-first-ask-questions-later-comments-on-
recent-teacher-effectiveness-studies [https://perma.cc/L7RX-WATM]; Diane Ravitch, Chetty-
Friedman-Rockoff Nonsense, DIANE RAVITCH'S BLOG (April 17, 2013), http://dianeravitch.net
/2013/04/17/chetty-friedman-rockoff-nonsense [http://perma.cc/9UXK-ZJ2V]; Unpacking
IMPACTS's Impact, or the Lack Thereof Fatal Flaws and Limitations with the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER)'s IMPACT Study, VANMOOZLED! BLOG (2013), vamboozled.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/IMPACTCritique.docx [http://perma.cc/G7PR-TSKQ].
285. Chetty et al., supra note 26, at 1.
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makes extrapolating the study's findings to prove specific causation for the
286entire state of California highly problematic.
Second, Chetty and his coauthors make no pretenses of how the study
could or should be a basis for adopting or eliminating education policies in a
particular state or district.287 Their claim is only that value-added models
should matter.288 They emphasize "that improving teacher quality is likely to
yield substantial returns for students," but admit that "the best way to
accomplish that goal is less clear."289 The authors further admit that attaching
some high stakes consequence to value-added models might degrade their
usefulness and validity.290 Thus, the authors concede that the value of their
study "is to illustrate the magnitudes of teachers' impacts [on student
achievement] rather than evaluate selection as a policy to improve teacher
quality."29 '
In other words, the research on which plaintiffs and the California trial
court rely make a point on which almost all agree: quality teaching matters. But
the research does not establish the more precise points for which plaintiffs seek
to use it. This lack of specificity is crucial given that courts have required past
litigants to present evidence regarding how policies and resources operate in a
292particular state and in particular schools. Teacher tenure challenges give no
indication that such evidence is forthcoming or necessary.
Plaintiffs and the trial court in Vergara simply assert a causal connection
between tenure policy and the prevalence of ineffective teaching in schools.
They are not alone. Several reports and anecdotal stories make the same
293assertion. But at this point, it is no more than an assertion. To date, no
research-based evidence substantiates the assertion, and as Sections III.D.3 and
III.D.4 demonstrate, specific causation, demonstrated through statistical
286. Given methodological flaws, a third-party reviewer of the Chetty study questioned
whether its conclusions were even true in regard to the sample it analyzed. ADLER, supra note 109, at
7-9. The study also pointed out that Chetty excluded conflicting evidence from his sample. Id. at 3-4.
287. Chetty et al., supra note 26, at 3-4.
288. See, e.g., id. at 3 ("We therefore conclude that our value-added measures provide unbiased
estimates of teachers' causal impacts on test scores despite the grouping of students on lagged gains
documented by Rothstein.").
289. d. at 6.
290. Id. at 5 ("[T]eachers were not incentivized based on test scores in the school district and
time period we study. The signal content of value-added might be lower when it is used to evaluate
teachers because of behavioral responses such as cheating or teaching to the test. Our results quantify
the gains from higher VA teachers in an environment without such distortions in teacher behavior"
(citations omitted).).
291. d. at 47.
292. Given the generally rigorous requirements of causation in education cases and the relative
weak evidence in Vergara, Kevin Welner characterizes the judge's causal finding as a gift to the
plaintiffs. Welner, supra note 31, at 143.
293. See, e.g., Beth Barrett, LAUSD's Dance of the Lemons, LA WEEKLY (Feb. 11, 2010),
http://www.laweekly.com/news/lausds-dance-of-the-lemons-2163764 [http://perma.cc/6NZ7-JKRC];
CHAIT, supra note 39; N.Y. STATE ScH. BDS. Ass'N, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ALL (2007).
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correlations with actual data from within the state, is necessary to sustain a
claim against education statutes that courts presume constitutional.
Establishing such a causal link is no easy task. The challenges in closing
the causal gap between money and student outcomes-and the need to wait on
social science progress-stymied school finance litigation from its infancy. In
fact, some courts and scholars still contest the causal link today.294 Social
science evidence in regard to tenure is no more definite than what was
available for school funding in the 1970s. Likewise, owing in part to the same
causal weakness that plagues tenure claims, state courts have consistently
proven resistant to education malpractice litigation. In a series of cases dating
back to 1976, individual students have argued that egregiously ineffective
teaching prevented them from graduating or progressing to a subsequent
295
grade. Courts have consistently rejected those claims, reasoning that too
many factors affect an individual student's educational outcomes and the harm
suffered as a result of ineffective teaching is too indefinite to infer a causal
296connection.
A recent article by Ethan Hutt and Aaron Tang argues that student growth
percentile models and value-added models provide a means for overcoming the
causal uncertainty that previously blocked education malpractice plans.297 If So,
the same would be true for the constitutional challenge to tenure. Hutt and
Tang rely heavily on the fact that student growth percentile models and value-
added models will create a baseline for acceptable teacher performance, allow
schools to objectively rank teachers, and put schools on notice of individual
ineffective teachers.298 Hutt and Tang, however, do not seriously engage the
flaws in those evaluations ystems that Section II.B of this Article points out.
They suggest it is enough that the models are data based and the best currently
299available. While they may be correct that the data these models produce is
the best we have, it does not establish a causal connection between particular
teachers and students, nor tenure and teaching effectiveness. At best, the data
puts schools and teachers on notice of a potential problem in teaching
effectiveness without demonstrating that here is a problem. Thus, current
294. See, e.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 464 (2009).
295. See Peter W. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App. 1976); see also
D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981); Bell v. Bd. of Educ.,
739 A.2d 321 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 408 N.Y.S.2d 584
(Sup. Ct. 1977), aff'd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979); Poe
v. Hamilton, 565 N.E.2d 887, 888 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
296. See, e.g., D.S. W., 628 P.2d at 556 ("The level of success which might have been achieved
had the mistakes not been made will, we believe, be necessarily incapable of assessment, rendering
legal cause an imponderable."); Smith v. Alameda Cty. Soc. Servs. Agency, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712, 718-
19 (Ct. App. 1979) (indicating precedent had rejected such claims because of "the difficulties of
assessing the wrongs and injuries involved").





student growth percentile models and value-added models do not establish that
tenure and retention policies play a causal role in ineffective teaching.300
b. Retaining Small Numbers of Ineffective Teachers May Not Rise to a
Constitutional Deprivation
The constitutional challenges to tenure also fail to sufficiently address the
requirement of a substantial and systematic constitutional violation. The current
challenges assume that the constitutional rights at stake can be personalized at a
level that does not require such a violation. Or the challenges assume that
tenure policies retain a sufficiently high number of ineffective teachers that a
constitutional violation occurs. No case law supports the former, and the latter
is factually problematic.3 0'
No one doubts that schools employ ineffective teachers. Many would
allow that there are a large number of ineffective teachers.302 But it does not
automatically follow that the number of ineffective teachers is high enough to
amount to a substantial and systematic constitutional violation. The complaints
in California and New York allege variances in teaching quality from
classroom to classroom and school to school,303 but variance alone does not
304create a constitutional violation. If a group of thirty students are taught by six
different teachers over the course of a semester, one ineffective teacher does
not automatically deprive the group of an adequate education. The adequacy of
education will depend on the subject taught by the ineffective teacher and the
quality of the group's other teachers.
Even if individual teachers could cause a substantial educational
deprivation, the deprivation may not be systematic. Plaintiffs estimate that Los
Angeles Unified School District employs approximately 1,000 grossly
305ineffective teachers, which might sound systematic on its face, but the
300. Plaintiffs' tenure challenge, reduced to its essence, claims a right to remove those
ineffective teachers that randomly appear in the education system, which more closely aligns with an
education malpractice claim. Hutt and Tang may be correct that it is time to revisit malpractice claims.
Plaintiffs in New York and California, however, appear to go much further and transform what would
otherwise be a malpractice claim into a wide-scale constitutional claim. Whether this is their specific
intent is unclear. But pursuing malpractice concerns through constitutional tenure litigation is
problematic because while students have a constitutional right to an equal and adequate education,
they have no right to choose their teachers, set the terms of their employment, or alter education policy
judgments outside of the ballot box.
301. See generally Welner, supra note 31, at 13 6-37 (emphasizing that the theory in Vergara
rests on a selective quotation of precedent and that it fails to look at the effect on education on the
whole as required).
302. Even a leading liberal think tank, the Center for American Progress has raised the issue.
CHAIT, supra note 39.
303. Vergara Complaint, supra note 11; Davids Complaint, supra note 252.
304. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 606 (Ct. App. 1989).
305. Vergara Complaint, supra note 11, at 11.
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district employs approximately 30,000 teachers in 900 schools.306 Thus,
plaintiffs claim amounts, on average, to one grossly ineffective teacher per
school, or one out of thirty teachers. This number could be higher and hence
more troubling in individual schools, but even then, the problem becomes
isolated and more likely a result of local than state policy.
To be clear, ineffective teaching is necessarily problematic, but not
necessarily a constitutional violation by the state. Unless a substantial problem
repeats itself across whole schools and districts, establishing a causal link to
state policy is difficult.307 At the statewide level, plaintiffs' even more
speculative estimate was even more diluted. They estimated one to three
grossly ineffective teachers out of one hundred,30 8 which is far from a
systematic and substantial problem.
Chetty's research does not establish the requisite harm either. Chetty
claims that removing these ineffective teachers would produce a $250,000
lifetime increase in earnings per classroom, which sounds like a meaningful
harm and the trial court agreed.309 But Bruce Baker points out that what Chetty
is really talking about are daily individual earnings that would not buy a cup of
coffee.310 Chetty's maximum estimated additional earnings per classroom is
$266,664.311 His minimum is half that. Apply his maximum estimate to an
average class of 26.6 students who work for about forty years after graduation,
the harm is only $250 of annual earnings per student ($266,000/26.6
students/40 years = $250) or about sixty-eight cents a day ($250/365.25 days=
0.6844).312 Those numbers pale in comparison to the type of harm and inequity
313
demonstrated in all other successful school finance cases.
306. LAUSD, DISTRICT ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT CARD 2006-2007 (2007). Plaintiffs'
expert, based on the assumption that 1 to 3 percent of teachers are ineffective, estimated that 2,750 to
8,250 grossly ineffective teachers were employed across the state. Vergara v. State, No. BC484642,
2014 WL 6478415, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014).
307. It may be that a claim could be brought against the school district on some other theory,
such as failure to properly manage teachers or to enforce existing tenure standards, or that the state is
liable for local mismanagement. But that claim is not made by the instant plaintiffs and is predicated
on a different theory. For a discussion of local districts' duty to deliver a constitutional education and
the state's responsibility for supervising it, see generally Black, supra note 17.
308. Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *4.
309. Id.
310. See Baker, supra note 284.
311. Chetty et al., supra note 26, at app. tbl. 14.
312. An independent review of the Chetty study found that even these numbers are significantly
inflated because they are based on false assumptions about wage growth and teacher impact. While
Chetty's study assumes a constant effect of quality teaching and a constant level of wage growth
across an individual's working years, the evidence shows that the effects of teaching fade across time,
as does the average percentage of wage growth. ADLER, supra note 109, at 5-6.
313. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Cal. 1971) (finding that "in Los Angeles
County, where plaintiff children attend school, the Baldwin Park Unified School District expended
only $577.49 to educate each of its pupils in 1968-1969; during the same year the Pasadena Unified
School District spent $840.19 on every student; and the Beverly Hills Unified School District paid out
$1,231.72 per child"); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 198 (Ky. 1989) ("Our
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c. Plaintiffs Have Not Established Who the Ineffective Teachers Are or
That They Can Be Replaced
Even if tenure was connected somehow to ineffective teaching, and the
effects were substantial and systematic, plaintiffs assume that these teachers
can be readily and reliably identified. That, however, is the primary ongoing
and unresolved challenge of public policy discussed in Parts I and II of this
Article. Not even Chetty and his coauthors, who fully support the consideration
of value-added models in general, claim to know who to terminate or what
processes should be followed prior to termination. Chetty's termination and
replacement assumption is about theoretical modeling, not making real
decisions about particular teachers. Chetty et al.'s study relies on averages to
conclude that teachers with certain value-added model scores are, on average,
ineffective teachers, and that dismissing teachers with certain value-added
model scores would raise student scores on average.314 This does not mean that
scores will rise for all students, for all classrooms, or that all dismissed teachers
are ineffective.
Chetty is clear that the value-added estimates of teaching effectiveness are
"noisy,"315 which in laymen's terms means the estimates include a substantial
level of uncertainty and randomness.3 16 At the aggregate level, this is not
necessarily problematic. But the noise is highly problematic if value-added
methods are going to be used to grant tenure, de-tenure, terminate, or pass over
a particular teacher. A U.S. Department of Education study found that "error
rates for comparing a teacher's performance to the average are likely to be
about 25 percent with three years of data and 35 percent with one year of data.
Corresponding error rates for overall false positive and negative errors are 10
and 20 percent, respectively."3 17 Even Chetty has acknowledged "there are
going to be mistakes [in relying on value-added scores]-teachers who get
fired who do not deserve to get fired."3 18
classroom teacher average salary is 84.68% of the national average and our per pupil expenditure is
78.20% of the national average.").
314. See, e.g., Chetty et al., supra note 26, at abstract ("On average, a one standard deviation
improvement in teacher VA in a single grade raises earnings by about 1% at age 28. Replacing a
teacher whose VA is in the bottom 5% with an average teacher would increase the present value of
students' lifetime income by more than $250,000 for the average class-room in our sample.").
315. Id.at49.
316. Statistical noise refers to unexplained variation in a sample. See generally 2 DAVID C.
LEBLANC, STATISTICS: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS FOR SCIENCE 318-19 (2004).
317. See PETER Z. SCHOCHET & HANLEY S. CHIANG, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ERROR RATES IN
MEASURING TEACHER AND SCHOOL PERFORMANCE BASED ON STUDENT TEST SCORE GAINS, at i
(2010), http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/20104004/pdf/20104004.pdf [http://perma.cc/HT6Q-65HF]; see
also ADLER, supra note 109, at 4-8 (questioning Chetty's findings because they are based on
unreliable value-added model scores and because Chetty's own study incorporates flawed
methodology).
318. Annie Lowrey, Big Study Links Good Teachers to Lasting Gain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2012,
at Al.
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If law and policy were, nonetheless, willing to accept this level of error to
achieve an average greater good, Chetty and his coauthors still admit that the
positives of dismissing teachers with low value-added model scores are
theoretical. Their study "assume[s] that deselected teachers are replaced by
teachers with the same amount of experience rather than rookies."3 19 It also
assumes that a teacher who has an average or high value-added score based on
teaching high achieving students can translate that teaching effectiveness to
another group of students.320 Even if the second assumption is true-and it is
not clear it is-an overwhelming scholarly record indicates that the teachers
who replace dismissed teachers in the schools that need them most are likely to
be rookie teachers with lower credentials than teachers in other schools.321 The
foregoing analysis is not a direct critique of the Chetty study, or of using value-
added models in general, but to distinguish the study's general findings about
value-added models from the plaintiffs' attempts to use Chetty's research to
322
justify the elimination of tenure or removal of particular teachers.
319. Chetty et al., supra note 26, at 48 n.60 (calculating that "hiring inexperienced teachers to
replace those deselected" would only reduce "the expected benefits of deselection . .. by less than
3%").
320. Id. at 50 ("One important caveat to these calculations is that they assume that teacher
effectiveness [] does not vary with classroom characteristics. Our estimates of VA only identify the
component of teacher quality that is orthogonal to lagged test scores and the other characteristics that
we control for to account for sorting. That is, teachers are evaluated relative to the average quality of
teachers with similar students, not relative to the population.").
321. See, e.g., Charles Clotfelter et al., High-Poverty Schools, supra note 35; Charles Clotfelter
et al., Wo Teaches Whom?, supra note 35; Eric A. Hanushek & Steven G. Rivkin, Pay, Working
Conditions, and Teacher Quality, FUTURE CHILD., Spring 2007, at 69; Hanushek et al., supra note 51
(finding that a 10 percent salary increase would be necessary for each increase of 10 percent in
minority student enrollment to induce white females to teach in the school); Susanna Loeb et al., supra
note 52; Parker, supra note 21; HEATHER G. PESKE & KATI HAYCOCK, THE EDUC. TRUST, TEACHING
INEQUALITY: How POOR AND MINORITY STUDENTS ARE SHORTCHANGED ON TEACHER QUALITY 2
(2006); see also FRANKENBERG, supra note 51 (revealing that teacher dissatisfaction tends to rise as
the percentage of minority students in a school rises, making it more likely that teachers will leave).
322. Bruce Baker concludes:
[T]he implications of this study for practice - for human resource policy in local public (or
private schools) [are] not much! A study like this can be used to guide simulations of what
might theoretically happen if we had 10,000 teachers, and were able to identify, with
slightly better than even odds, the "really good" teachers - keep them, and fire the rest
(knowing that we have high odds that we are wrongly firing many good teachers ... but
accepting this fact on the basis that we are at least slightly more likely to be right than
wrong in identifying future higher vs. lower value-added producers). As I noted on my
previous post, this type of big data - this type of small margin-of-difference finding in big
data - really isn't helpful for making determinations about individual teachers in the real
world. Yeah ... works great in big-data simulations based on big-data findings, but that's
about it.
Indeed it's an interesting study, but to suggest that this study has important immediate
implications for school and district level human resource management is not only naive, but
reckless and irresponsible and must stop.





d. Tenure Policies Intersect with Several Other Factors and Policies That
Must Be Considered
While assuming causal connections regarding tenure, plaintiffs ignore the
potential causal effects of other policies and factors. Plaintiffs need not
challenge the overall structure of education, but a reliable causal analysis
requires that they account for the causal role of other policies and factors.
Tenure might very well correlate with educational outcomes, but without
accounting for other important variables, one cannot reasonably determine
whether tenure is masking some other underlying or overarching causal factors.
Disaggregating outcomes by multiple core variables is standard practice in
education research and litigation. In the challenge to tenure, at least, four other
significant factors that intersect with teaching quality and student outcomes
must be accounted for: (i) race, (ii) money, (iii) the teaching market, and (iv)
principals' decision-making role. The current lawsuits do not fully account for
these factors.
i. Racial Inequalities, Funding Gaps, and Teacher Market Forces
The most obvious factors for which causal analysis must account are
student demographics. "Numerous empirical research studies document the
numerous factors external to classroom teacher performance that can directly
impact student performance on standardized tests such as inadequate school
resources, large classroom sizes, parental education attainment, and high
populations of English language learners."323 Some states, however, "have
embraced the presumption that teacher competence is the primary contributor
to student performance without examining its validity." 324
The Vergara plaintiffs' only allusion to the relevance of demographic
factors is their allegation that racial minorities are disproportionately exposed
to ineffective teachers.325 This allegation is certainly consistent with social
science literature on differential exposure to ineffective teaching,326 but this
allegation does not disaggregate the potential causes of that exposure or its
effects. To statistically assess the impact that a teacher's instruction has on
students and whether it rises to the level of ineffective, the demographics of
that teacher's students, as well as the demographics of the students to whom
327teacher's students are to be compared, must be known.
323. McNeal, supra note 110, at 506.
324. Id.
325. Vergara Complaint, supra note 11, at 1.
326. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 21.
327. The Chetty study does control for ethnicity, gender, age, receipt of special education
services, limited English proficiency, and poverty in some respects, see Chetty et al., supra note 26, at
14, but the study also includes certain assumptions and biases that would prevent plaintiffs from using
it to make the conclusions they seek. See id. at 2 n.4 ("This quasi-experimental test relies on the
assumption that teacher departures and arrivals are not correlated at a high frequency with student
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The second set of factors for which plaintiffs do not account are those
relating to teacher hiring. For teacher tenure to cause ineffective teaching,
plaintiffs need to establish, for instance, that there are other qualified teachers
in the market to replace those whom districts would fire, and that those
qualified teachers would accept positions in the disadvantaged schools.328 As
noted above, studies suggest neither is the case.329 One of the most intractable
problems in our current education system is expanding the pool of qualified
teachers.33 0 There simply are not enough good teachers to go around.33' Until
an oversupply of qualified teachers occurs, disadvantaged schools will have to
compete to hire them, and they will often lose out to other schools.
Money and race play significant roles in this competition. First,
disadvantaged schools have fewer resources to hire teachers.332 Second,
research shows that, independent of money, teachers with choices-those that
are highly qualified-choose to teach in schools with fewer poor and minority
students.333 These findings are entirely consistent with plaintiffs' claims that
"grossly ineffective teachers are disproportionately situated in schools that
serve predominantly low-income and minority students."334 But plaintiffs
ignore the precedent causes of these inequalities: race and money. Instead,
plaintiffs assume that the antecedent occurrence of tenure is a causal factor. In
short, school funding and segregation play a significant role in access to quality
teachers, with which tenure may have absolutely nothing to do.
characteristics."); id. (assuming that teacher effectiveness remains constant across student groups, but
only making in group comparisons).
328. Plaintiffs are relatively forthright in this assumption. They indicate the problem is not the
pool but an inability to correct bad initial hires once tenure and due process protections kick in.
Vergara Complaint, supra note 11, at 11 ("[G[rossly ineffective teachers are routinely hired into the
California school system and granted [tenure]. Even after their grossly ineffective performance is
discovered, such teachers are not dismissed for their poor performance.").
329. See supra note 321; see also Derek W. Black, In Defense of Voluntary Desegregation: All
Things Are Not Equal, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 107, 119 (2009) (discussing the inequitable access
to quality, experienced teachers in predominantly poor and minority schools).
330. CASSANDRA GUARINO ET AL., RAND EDUC., A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH LITERATURE
ON TEACHER RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION (2004); U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, LEADERS &
LAGGARDS: A STATE-BY-STATE REPORT CARD ON K-12 EDUCATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 9 (2014)
("States consistently scored higher in the ability to identify teacher quality, retain good teachers, and
exit bad ones ... but scored extremely low on preparing teachers and expanding the pool of good
teachers."); see also LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION: How
AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 163-93 (2010) (discussing
how other countries make the teaching profession more attractive).
331. See Oluwole, supra note 33, at 184 (advocating for the transfer of teachers to high-need
schools). A U.S. Department of Education study found that transfers are an effective solution. See U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., TRANSFER INCENTIVES FOR HIGH PERFORMING TEACHERS: FINAL RESULTS FROM
A MULTISITE RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT (2013).
332. THE EDUC. TRUST, FUNDING GAPS 2006, at 7 tbl.4 (2006).
333. See generally David, supra note 52; FRANKENBERG, supra note 51 (as the percentage of
minority students in a school rises, the qualification and experience level of teachers therein tends to
decrease); Hanushek et al., supra note 51, at 337 ("[T]eachers systematically favor higher achieving,
nonminority, non low-income students."); Parker, supra note 21.
334. Vergara Complaint, supra note 11, at 11.
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Because plaintiffs' causal premises are so simplistic, they also ignore the
possibility that terminating ineffective teachers might make matters worse for
the students they seek to help. If all other factors stayed the same, terminating
more teachers would most likely leave poor and minority schools with fewer
teachers than they currently have,335 or potentially force those schools to
replace terminated teachers with even lower quality teachers. Of course, it is
possible that eliminating unqualified teachers might have a positive effect on
the overall teaching pool and, thus, present schools with more hiring options.
Hence, terminations may produce a net gain. But the effects of teacher
terminations are simply unknown. It is also possible that the teaching pool
might shrink even further, as current teachers-including quality ones-seek to
escape a profession with rising pressures and risks, while others are
discouraged from joining it in the first place.336 The net result of this effect
would be negative for all schools but fall disproportionately on disadvantaged
schools.337
In short, an underdeveloped teaching pool, school funding inequities, and
racial segregation all indicate that the problem of ineffective teaching may not
be tenure but the unequal distribution of ineffective teachers, which
concentrates them in disadvantaged schools. Recognizing these larger
structural inequalities, prior litigants have consistently and directly challenged
funding inequality and segregation rather than the effects these first-order
problems produce in teacher quality. Ignoring structural inequality not only
oversimplifies causal analysis, it assumes that more effective teachers can be
had for free in segregated environments.
ii. Principals' Reluctance to Evaluate or Terminate Teachers
Principals' decision making also plays an obvious role in the retention of
ineffective teachers. Plaintiffs implicitly assume that these principals are ready,
willing, and able to terminate ineffective teachers if tenure did not exist.338 This
assumption ignores two key factors. First, research indicates that principals
may not be willing to terminate teachers. Principals often hold low expectations
335. Some advocate that this is exactly what we need. See, e.g., Dagostino, supra note 59, at
187 (advocating that it would be better to increase class size); MICHAEL HANSEN, THE THOMAS B.
FORDHAM INST., RIGHT-SIZING THE CLASSROOM: MAKING THE MOST OF GREAT TEACHERS (2013)
(advocating for larger class sizes).
336. See generally Superfine, supra note 53; see also Rebell, supra note 56, at 1948 ("Instead
of carefully weighing the impact of budget reductions on school operations, many governors and
leaders are undermining the prestige of the profession and the morale of current educators."); Fernanda
Santos, Teacher Survey Shows Morale Is at a Low Point, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2012, at A13
(describing teacher morale at twenty-year low). But see Superfine, supra note 53 (summarizing the
argument that focusing on teacher effectiveness would motivate many existing teachers).
337. See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 104 (finding no strong evidence to support the notion that
evaluation systems based on student scores would improve teaching); Welner, supra note 31, at 135
(indicating removing tenure might make hard-to-staff schools even harder to staff).
338. Vergara Complaint, supra note 11; Davids Complaint, supra note 252.
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for teachers and are reluctant to "rock the boat" by harshly evaluating
teachers.33 9 In other words, principals may be uninterested in using the tools
available to them to terminate teachers.340 Thus, even if terminating teachers
could produce net gains for schools, the bigger causal problem may lie with
principals, not teachers. At he very least, tenure is not the significant cause that
plaintiffs assume.
Second, for tenure to play a significant causal role, it must be the case that
principals would disregard and overcome the structural funding, poverty, and
race challenges within which they make decisions.34' Some might disregard
these factors, but they will still be subject to them after they terminate a
teacher. Thus, their ability to terminate a teacher may still have little effect on
teacher quality as the other factors are left unaddressed.
In sum, this Article does not purport to know the precise causal role that
race, funding, teaching markets, or principals play in teaching effectiveness. It
is the plaintiffs who must answer these and other causal questions. They have
not. Instead, they assume that causation exists or expect courts to draw causal
inferences on supposition. Prior courts dealing with equity and adequacy
litigation have refused to do so.
F. Last-in-First-out: A Narrower but Easier Case to Make
Last-in-first-out (LIFO) statutes ensure that senior teachers are retained
during reductions-in-force over junior teachers, regardless of teaching
342effectiveness. California's statute not only requires that senior teachers in an
individual school be retained, it requires district-wide reassignment if
necessary.343 To be clear, however, LIFO statutes do not exist in many states,
and even where they do, they are not necessarily as pro-seniority as the
339. See, e.g., EDWIN M. BRIDGES, THE INCOMPETENT TEACHER: MANAGERIAL RESPONSES
25-26 (rev. & extended ed. 1992); DANA GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS: A HISTORY OF
AMERICA'S MOST EMBATTLED PROFESSION (2014); Suzanne R. Painter, Principals' Perceptions of
Barriers to Teacher Dismissal, 14 J. PERS. EVALUATION IN EDUC. 253 (2000).
340. The districts for which principals work may also be resistant to certain teacher evaluations
and terminations. See ALEJANDRO SANDOVAL, EDVOICE INST., STUDENT PROGRESS IGNORED: AN
EXAMINATION OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOL DISTRICTS' COMPLIANCE WITH THE STULL ACT 4-5 (2015)
(finding that most districts in the State had failed or refused to implement the new statutorily required
teacher evaluation system based on student achievement).
341. Welner, supra note 31, at 132.
342. The statute specifically provides: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, the services
of no permanent employee may be terminated under the provisions of this section while any
probationary employee, or any other employee with less seniority, is retained to render a service which
said permanent employee is certificated and competent o render." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955(b)
(West 2015).
343. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955(c) (West 2015) ("The governing board shall make assignments
and reassignments in such a manner that employees shall be retained to render any service which their
seniority and qualifications entitle them to render.").
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California or New York statutes.344 But assuming a more stringent LIFO statute
like that in California, the constitutional challenge to seniority protections has
stronger potential merits than the challenge to tenure. In particular, the
reassignment, retention, and dismissal of teachers pursuant to LIFO come far
closer to meeting the substantial and systematic harm requirements than tenure
claims currently do.
First, by definition, LIFO statutes have an immediate, direct, and district-
wide effect on the teaching force because they require the reassignment,
retention, and dismissal of teachers across and within schools. Second,
California school districts have, in fact, previously initiated the process during
times of recession, including the Great Recession of 2009.345 Third, this
process is not optional. Rather, it is compelled and, thereby, caused by state
statute. Fourth, the potential harm suffered by terminating and reshuffling
teachers based on seniority is relatively clear. At best, studies indicate that
experience has a bearing on teacher quality during the first few years, but
346beyond that, experience does not necessarily correlate with teaching quality.
Thus, in many instances, a LIFO policy would require districts to dismiss and
replace teachers based on a factor that has little, if any, bearing on teacher
quality. In these four respects, the notion that the state is causing systematic
and substantial educational harm is not merely speculative when LIFO
procedures go into effect.
With that said, a few open questions remain. The first is whether the
particular teachers actually transferred and dismissed under a LIFO policy
produce a net negative result in teaching effectiveness. The trial court in
Vergara did not engage this factual question, but assumed that the dismissal of
highly qualified junior teachers before less effective senior ones would occur
and produce significant harm.347 To their credit, plaintiffs, however, had
alleged that a prior reduction-in-force in various districts in the California had
"resulted in the retention of thousands of low performing teachers who
happened to have more years of experience than the teachers included in the
344. See generally MARY DOWELL ET AL., NAT'L SCH. BDS. Ass'N, REFORM OF SENIORITY-
BASED LAYOFF RULES FOR TEACHERS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 7-17 (2011),
http://www.1cwlegal.com/files/95049_NSBA-White-Paper-Reform-of-Seniority-Based-Layoff-Rules-
for-Teachers.pdf [http://perma.cc/7JY9-CWNK].
345. See, e.g., UCLA INST. FOR DEMOCRACY, EDUC., & ACCESS, SHARING THE BURDEN? THE
IMPACT OF PROPOSED TEACHER LAYOFFS ACROSS LAUSD (2009),
http://idea.gseis.ucla.edu/newsroom/newsroom-folder/april-13-2009 [http://perma.cc/3DUP-F2PR].
346. Mufioz & Chang, supra note 49, at 149, 157 (showing previous results are mixed as to
whether experience matters and finding, based on a new examination, that years of experience "have
little effect on student achievement"); JENNIFER KING RICE, NAT'L CTR. FOR ANALYSIS OF
LONGITUDINAL DATA IN EDUC. RESEARCH, THE IMPACT OF TEACHER EXPERIENCE: EXAMINING THE
EVIDENCE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2010), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco
/publication-pdfs/1001455-The-Impact-of-Teacher-Experience.PDF [http://perma.cc/FS28-V3JD].
347. Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27,
2014). The court did not look further because it assumed a sufficient harm to trigger strict scrutiny and
shift the burden to the state. Id.
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layoffs. One study found that nearly 2,000 English Language Arts teachers and
more than 1,500 math teachers in the lowest quartile of teacher performance
kept their jobs, while 20 percent of the ELA and math teachers laid off were in
the top quartile of teacher performance."348
These numbers, like those mentioned in regard to the tenure claims, do
not necessarily amount to a substantial diminution of education quality.349 They
could be dispersed across enough schools and students that they do not
substantially degrade educational outcomes overall for schools.350 The way in
which LIFO operates in California, however, gives it the potential to narrow
and concentrate its effect more perniciously. The policy could easily result in
the widespread dismissal of large swaths of the teaching force in hard-to-staff
schools to make way for senior teachers from across the district. For instance,
one Oakland, California, elementary school hired an entirely new teaching staff
in 2007 and apparently saw significant improvements in student
achievement.351 But in the midst of a recession, the district planned to lay off
352
every teacher in that school at the end of the 2010-11 school year. This level
of turnover, regardless of quality, comes with a cost for the school and its
students.35 3 If turnover requires the school district to transfer more senior, but
on average less effective, teachers to the school, a constitutional level harm
may very well exist.
The second open question is whether a state's LIFO statute should be
analyzed in the context of the overall challenge of ensuring teaching quality or
in isolation. The tenure analysis in Part III.E pointed out the various flaws that
flow from an isolated analysis of tenure. As a practical matter, the LIFO statute
plays a relatively small role in access to quality teachers across time. While
systematic in nature, one only finds a substantial harm from LIFO by
narrowing the frame of reference to a single moment in time and the particular
348. Vergara Complaint, supra note 11, at 17-18.
349. See supra Part III.E.2.b.
350. Of course, an individual student might be harmed in some particular instance, but for such
a claim to be actionable, it would implicate the right versus duty distinctions raised in supra note 216
and infra note 352.
351. Lillian R. Mongeau, All Teachers and Administrators at Futures Elementary in Danger of
Lay Offs, OAKLAND N. (Mar. 17, 2011), https://oaklandnorth.net/2011/03/17/all-teachers-and-admin-
at-futures-elementary-in-danger-of-lay-offs [https://perma.cc/B4RT-WRWQ]; Katy Murphy, Poor
Schools Bear Layoff Brunt: Campuses in Neediest Neighborhoods Could See Teaching Staff Slashed
Under "Last-in, First-Out," OAKLAND TRIB., Mar. 16, 2011, at 11 A; see also Dagostino, supra note
59, at 178-79.
352. See Mongeau, supra note 351.
353. See, e.g., Reed v. United Teachers L.A., 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454, 473 (Ct. App. 2012)
(quoting defendant's expert saying "schools with high teacher turnover can fall into a 'vicious cycle'
in which the high turnover itself makes it more difficult to recruit and retain teachers, contributing to
continued high turnover"); GARY BARNES ET AL., NAT'L COMM'N ON TEACHING & AM.'s FUTURE,
THE COST OF TEACHER TURNOVER IN FIVE SCHOOL DISTRICTS: A PILOT STUDY (2007),
http://nctaforg/wp-content/uploads/CTTFullReportfinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/X2P4-EU5Y] (discussing
the cost of turnover in general and noting, for instance, the cost of each teacher turnover in a North
Carolina school district was $10,000).
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schools it will impact most at that time. Moreover, assuming no new large
recessions in the immediate future, striking down a LIFO statute would have no
foreseeable effect on teacher effectiveness while all the other factors that do
affect teachers remain in effect.
A court looking for an ongoing, systematic harm may not find one in
LIFO. These reservations aside, LIFO can easily be separated from the overall
teacher management structure and is susceptible to isolated treatment. If it
does, in fact, create a constitutional harm in a particular school at a particular
time, no obvious doctrinal principles would limit a court from intervening.3 5
But again California's and New York's LIFO statutes are particularly stringent,
and the problems they may create are less likely to arise in other states. Thus,
the foregoing analysis suffices for the purposes of this Article. The next Part
offers further discussion on the more important issue of how courts should
respond to the constitutional challenge to tenure.
IV.
A REASONED JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO TEACHER TENURE CHALLENGES
The highest courts in California, New York, and other states will soon be
called on to decide the validity of the constitutional challenge to tenure.355
Courts should, with caveats, recognize a cause of action, as plaintiffs have
stated a theoretically valid claim within existing precedent. But courts should
reject plaintiffs' challenge as applied because their claims cannot be
substantiated. Law, facts, and important policy considerations all point to this
conclusion.
A. Plaintiffs Have Stated a Theoretically Valid Claim
Plaintiffs' claims easily fall within existing school finance precedent and
theory. State teacher tenure policies can theoretically violate students' right to
either a quality or an equal education. A court would struggle to bar such a
cause of action without also doing damage to the overall evolution of education
rights. Those education rights are currently broad sufficiently so that
354. It is possible, however, that the distinction between education rights and education duties
might more clearly surface as the claim is narrowed to particular teachers, classes, or schools. As noted
supra notes 161, 214, and 221, some debate exists as to whether state constitutions and school finance
precedent establish individual education rights or only education duties. If they only establish general
education duties, this might force a broader analysis on courts that precludes the consideration of
individualized harms as constitutionally redressable harms. See generally Scott R. Bauries, State
Constitutions and Individual Rights: Conceptual Convergence in School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 301, 322 (2011) (distinguishing education claim-rights from duties); Scott R. Bauries,
The Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 705 (2012) (distinguishing education claim-rights
from duties).
355. Potential locations for litigation beyond California and New York include Connecticut,
Oregon, New Jersey, and Minnesota. See Edwards, supra note 6; McGuire, supra note 253. That
number could easily expand, given that StudentsFirst, a national non-profit that works in ten different
states, is pushing the litigation. See Rich, supra note 253.
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numerous prior adjudications have found that access to quality teaching is part
of a state's constitutional obligation to students. To exclude plaintiffs' current
tenure claims, a court would need to narrow the principles previously
announced in school finance cases. This might cut short and eliminate currently
flawed tenure claims, but it would also damage important claims other
plaintiffs will likely press in the future in areas like discipline and segregation.
The ability of state education rights to provide checks on school discipline and
segregation depend on continued broad interpretations of the right to
356education. In short, the constitutional challenge to tenure is new but not
entirely distinct. Courts should not alter important precedent just to avoid
addressing the substantive issues involved in tenure challenges.
Courts should, however, narrow the circumstances under which they will
entertain tenure challenges. First, courts should reject facial challenges to
tenure statutes. No high court has previously invalidated education statutes
under such circumstances. Those courts have always required school finance,
and analogous litigants, to establish their cases on the facts. Reliance on local
property tax to fund schools, for instance, is not per se unconstitutional; neither
are funding levels well below the national average, nor funding disparities.357
There is no more reason to infer a facial violation based on teacher tenure than
any other education policy.
Second, based on permissive pleading rules, a court should allow
plaintiffs' current challenge to tenure to proceed. Under the traditional
approach, plaintiffs' claim could survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim only if "it appears beyond doubt hat the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." 358 While
plaintiffs' claims are riddled with factual flaws and assumptions, the law would
provide relief if the plaintiffs could establish their factual claims. It is not
impossible that they might marshal the necessary evidence to do so.
Courts recognizing a properly stated claim, however, should signal
implicitly or explicitly to plaintiffs that they need to establish more precise
facts than their current complaints allege. In particular, plaintiffs would need to
establish substantial and systematic violations (unless a court intends to
personalize the claim, which would raise other issues)359 and demonstrate two-
step causation. In Vergara, a trial has already occurred, so the appellate court
can easily overturn the trial court's holding-as the facts insufficiently
establish the claim-or remand for further factual findings on the necessary
356. See generally Black, supra note 17; Bloomenthal, supra note 214.
357. See Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 606 (Ct. App. 1986) (requiring substantial
disparities that affect outcomes); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996).
358. The traditional federal approach was "that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt hat the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), abrogated
by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
359. See supra note 354.
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causal questions the trial court did not address. Upon analyzing those
questions, the trial court itself could reject plaintiffs' claim on the facts. But in
those cases yet to be tried, a clear indication of the necessary evidence would
help cut short otherwise futile litigation.
A court adopting the new federal approach to pleading, however, might
dismiss the current claims, as currently conceived. The new federal approach
assesses whether the allegations are plausible and whether they include all of
the necessary material elements of the claim.360 This approach would offer a
court the ability to dismiss tenure challenges for failure to allege two-step
causation, for instance, or for implausibility given the various causal
uncertainties ignored or oversimplified by plaintiffs. With that said, even under
a heightened pleading approach, plaintiffs allege causation, from which one
could reasonably infer an allegation of two-step causation. Likewise, although
current social science strongly indicates that plaintiffs will not be able to
substantiate their claim, the claim itself is not implausible. Plaintiffs, now or in
the future, might further develop the necessary evidence themselves. Courts
looking to conserve judicial resources could dismiss the claims not on legal
theory, but on the factual allegations themselves, leaving open the possibility of
future litigation.
B. Plaintiffs Have Not Proven a Constitutional Violation
Barring new social science developments and a better appreciation of
causation by plaintiffs, those courts that permit plaintiffs to proceed to trial
should find that plaintiffs have failed to establish their claim. First, the general
evidence alleged in the current complaints and presented at trial in Vergara
fails to establish that ineffective teaching rises to the level of systemic and
substantial deprivations of the constitutional right to education. Second, even if
such a deprivation exists, plaintiffs have not shown that tenure is the cause of
that deprivation, nor that the deprivation has a causal effect on student
outcomes. Third, any showing or inference to that effect would be unreliable
because plaintiffs' case fails to sufficiently account for many demographic
factors and other state policies that affect teaching quality and student
outcomes.
Of course, the challenge in New York and various other states must be
tried. One cannot say for certain that plaintiffs will not be able to substantiate
360. The Court recently abrogated the traditional pleading approach. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). States, of course, have their own
pleading rules, but they have generally followed the traditional approach and have been slow to change
it. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading in State Courts after Twombly and Jqbal (Pound Civil Justice
Institute Forum for State Appellate Court Judges, 2010), http://ssm.com/abstract=2038349
[http://perma.cc/E2NH-V4SR]. According to Spencer, California and New York have not replicated
the new federal standard, although California's standard is similar to the more demanding old "fact
pleading" regime that preceded the permissive "notice pleading" regime from Conley and New York
courts have cited Jqbal with approval. Id.
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their case. The foregoing is simply to say it is highly unlikely that they can, not
that plaintiffs should be denied the opportunity to try. To the contrary, allowing
plaintiffs the opportunity to make their case has merit. Some courts were too
quick to dismiss plaintiffs' school finance claims during the 1970s and 1980s361
362
based on courts' own assumptions of what facts could be shown. When
social science and evidence later developed, plaintiffs were barred from
bringing claims or, at least, seriously prejudiced in some states.363 While tenure
challenges are seriously flawed on current facts, things may change in the
future. Notwithstanding the flaws that plague value-added models and student
growth percentile models, those systems are well positioned to make
364improvements, if not breakthroughs. Remaining open to those potential
breakthroughs, as well as variations of plaintiffs' theory, is important to the
continued development and enforcement of the constitutional right to
education.
C. The Multifaceted Nature of the Problem and Public Policy Deference
Caution Against Judicial Intervention in Tenure
Even if plaintiffs could establish some generalized correlation between
tenure and educational outcomes, it is not obvious that the solution is to
eliminate tenure or terminate teachers. The solution to the problem is bound up
in a complex set of public policies and market factors. Any number of different
solutions or combined solutions is plausible. The call to eliminate tenure or
accelerate teacher terminations is premised on the notion that there is a reliable
means by which to achieve that end, but states are still in the experimental
stages of altering teacher evaluations (which explains the numerous flaws in
365the new systems). Wading into the politics and efficacy of terminating
teachers, without solid social science and causal evidence, could place courts'
361. This wait-and-see approach would appear to be what the trial court in New York is doing.
See Davids v. State, No. 10115/14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 12, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com
/files/2015-march-motion-to-dismiss-denied--a-043---davids-wright.pdf [http://perma.cc/V9VT-
P7AC] (order denying motions to dismiss) (recognizing the potential evidentiary problems with
plaintiffs' claim, but emphasizing that the question at the dismissal stage is simply whether plaintiffs
have made the required allegations, which plaintiffs had made).
362. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1973) ("Apart from
the unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of education may be determined by the amount
of money expended for it, a sufficient answer to appellees' argument is that, at least where wealth is
involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages."); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 160-61 (Ga. 1981).
363. In Georgia, for instance, plaintiffs have struggled to restart litigation in their state,
notwithstanding the theoretical and factual merits in the state. See School Funding Cases in Georgia,
NAT'L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, http://schoolfunding.info/2012/01/school-finding-cases-in-georgia
[http://perma.cc/L4FC-PXKT] (last visited Oct. 29, 2015).
364. Superfine, supra note 53, at 606 ("[T]eacher evaluation and accountability reforms appear
to be moving in a positive direction.").
365. See generally Baker et al., supra note 30.
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institutional legitimacy in danger. Courts are ill equipped to mediate a political
366debate over experimentation with teacher evaluation.
It is, likewise, nearly impossible for courts to predict the various indirect
effects that altering teacher tenure and retention will produce, much less
whether those effects do or do not outweigh the benefits.367 Some have already
suggested that new teacher evaluation systems and attacks on teacher tenure are
361playing a role in the teacher shortage that developed in California in 2015.
Likewise, in New Mexico, students recently challenged the State's new student
growth percentile model teacher evaluation and removal system as a violation
of their constitutional right to education. They allege that the "evaluation
system ... hinders Defendants' duty to provide a uniform and sufficient system
for all students by unfairly evaluating good teachers and by not ensuring those
teachers who need improvement have adequate support to improve their
instruction."369 Furthermore, the system undermines "teacher recruitment and
retention efforts, especially in districts and campuses with higher populations
of minority and at-risk students.... [Q]uality teachers have requested transfers
out of such schools, and they have refused transfers into such schools because
of the punitive teacher evaluation system."370 Rather than helping these
students, the student growth percentile model system often makes matters
worse for the neediest students.37' In short, teacher tenure and evaluation
systems are in such flux that, in New Mexico, students challenge their
existence as unconstitutional, while in California and New York, students
challenge their absence as unconstitutional.
Analogous indirect effects of altering tenure may also move beyond
teachers themselves. Teacher tenure policy intersects with any number of other
education policies, including curriculum, funding, hiring, assessment, and
student assignment. Any change in tenure has the capacity to produce ripple
effects in these other areas. These effects may or may not support the end goal
of delivering a constitutional education.372 If not, resolving one problem
tenure-would just create another. Thus, while a challenge to teacher tenure
366. See generally Bauries, supra note 192, 961-65, 977 (emphasizing the polycentrenic nature
of education policy and the problem of courts intervening).
367. See, e.g., Chetty et al., supra note 26, at 32 (pointing out that the study conducted a value-
added method analysis after the fact on teachers who had never been held accountable for and their
students' test scores and that moving to such a regime might actually undermine the reliability of
value-added models themselves).
368. Valerie Strauss, The Real Reasons Behind the U.S. Teacher Shortage, WASH. POST (Aug.
24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2015/08/24/the-real-reasons-
behind-the-u-s-teacher-shortage [https://perma.cc/927A-7A2E].
369. Martinez Complaint, supra note 42, at 42.
370. Id.
371. See id.
372. See generally Rebell, supra note 56 (discussing policy approaches other than value-added
models and student growth percentile models that detractors might consider).
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may be theoretically valid, the polycentric nature of tenure may render an
isolated judicial analysis practically unmanageable.373
Where multiple different problems-some of which are non-legal-and
multiple different solutions are plausible, separation of powers principles
dictate courts should be very cautious about intervening.374 Constitutional
education litigation is not a vehicle for courts to second-guess policy decisions
reserved for the legislature.375 School funding litigation has avoided these
policy problems through a careful litigation strategy and an exacting judicial
analysis missing from the tenure challenge. First, so-called school funding
litigation is not just about funding.376 Rather, it involves a macro-assessment of
the education system that is not about dictating specific solutions but dictating
specific responsibility to the state for finding solutions.
Second, even when reduced to a financial dictate, prior litigation is
primarily about expanding the financial pot. This may produce negative ripple
effects in other areas of the state budget, but it is less likely to produce negative
effects within education. Tenure and retention challenges are the equivalent of
stirring or sifting the pot without knowing what the results will be. Third,
adequacy and equity litigation focus on money because money places
education systems in a position to address educational challenges in the myriad
ways their local circumstances require.377 Thus, money is a concession to
polycentric problems and that educators must address them based on local
circumstances. The tenure challenge, in contrast, seeks to have plaintiffs
define-as in eliminating or restricting tenure-rigid solutions.
Finally, any restrictions that a constitutional right to education might
place on teacher tenure must comply with the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
373. See McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 247 (Wash. 2012) ("The legislature's 'uniquely
constituted fact-finding and opinion gathering processes' provide the best forum for addressing the
difficult policy questions inherent in forming the details of an education system."); see also Bauries,
supra note 31, at 961-65, 977; William S. Koski, The Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in
Education Policy Reform Litigation, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1226 (2004). Polycentricity has been a
dominant issue in products liability, where one scholar explains adjudication is ill-advised:
[T]he distinguishing characteristic of nonjusticiable cases is that the issues "are interrelated
in such a way that sensible consideration of any issue, or element, requires the simultaneous
consideration of most, or all, of the others." Adjudication "requires problems the various
issues and elements of which may be taken up in an orderly sequence," and thus is ill-suited
to the resolution of polycentric, nonlinear problems.
Aaron D. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect
Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521, 552
(1982) (citations omitted).
374. See generally Bauries, supra note 192.
375. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 247; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 828 N.Y.S.2d 235, 243
(N.Y. 2006) ("The role of the courts is not, as Supreme Court assumed, to determine the best way to
calculate the cost of a sound basic education in New York City schools, but to determine whether the
State's proposed calculation of that cost is rational.").
376. See generally Black, supra note 17.




Constitution.378 As discussed in Part II.C, systems that both effectuate the ends
that plaintiffs desire and pass due process analysis are not currently available.
Neither the plaintiffs nor the trial court in Vergara pay these due process
concerns any attention. The failure to do so could be to replace the tenure
system that violates the state constitution with another that violates the Federal
Constitution. In sum, any or all of the foregoing policy problems caution
against the judicial intervention that plaintiffs currently seek.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional challenge to tenure highlights a crucial point in social
science research, school finance precedent, and the past decade of federal
policy: the centrality of quality teachers to educational outcomes. While past
policy reforms have recognized this point, none have managed to significantly
improve teaching. Unfortunately, the current constitutional challenge to tenure
does not either. The constitutional claim does, however, potentially achieve
two other important ends. First, it elevates the concerns over ineffective
teaching to a new plane. Rather than simply a policy prerogative, quality
classroom teaching is part of students' constitutional right to education, which
demands a remedy. Second, the constitutional challenge to tenure expands the
theoretical boundaries of school finance precedent. That precedent, when read
properly, provides a basis to reform educational inequality through means other
than money.
The challenge to tenure, nonetheless, has not matured to a point that
warrants judicial intervention to eliminate tenure. Currently available evidence
does not establish the causal- and injury-related facts necessary to make out
state responsibility for a constitutional violation. Moreover, even if a violation
existed, any number of other remedies might be appropriate. Due to separation
of powers limitations, the choice of permissible remedies must be left to
legislatures. Both state and federal legislatures are already experimenting with
ways to improve instruction; some involve tenure, some do not. While state
constitutions guarantee students an equal and adequate education, those
constitutions do not afford courts the authority to intervene with preordained
remedies, especially in the context of factual uncertainty.
378. See generally Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981)
(articulating the due process limits on graduation exam).
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